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THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM: LAW, NORMS, 
AND TECHNOLOGY 
CHRISTOPHER G. BRADLEY† 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the tools consumers use to buy and borrow have 
changed radically. New technologies for advertising, contracting, and 
transacting have proliferated, and so have fierce policy debates on issues 
such as identity theft and online privacy; arbitration clauses and class ac-
tion lawsuits; and Americans’ accumulation of debt and the unsavory prac-
tices sometimes used by collectors of it. Facing these realities, scholars, 
policymakers, and advocates have devoted increasing energy to this area 
of law. Despite its prominence, confusion persists regarding what con-
sumer protection really is or does. Though much discussed, it remains un-
dertheorized. In particular, analysis of consumer law and policy has not 
sufficiently taken account of the implications of social and technological 
change. 
This Article constructs a new model of the consumer protection eco-
system by contextualizing purely legal constraints amid the other realities 
of commercial relationships. Drawing on scholarship in the areas of tech-
nology, social change, and law, the model lays out three basic types of 
constraints on the activities of participants in consumer commercial trans-
actions: legal, technical, and social. This model provides a basis for ex-
ploring how those constraints interact and shape behavior.  
The model has significant ramifications for scholars, policymakers, 
and advocates. It underscores why the area of consumer commerce defies 
one-size-fits-all solutions: good policies require not only consideration of 
consumers, merchants, and the commercial relationships they pursue, but 
of the dynamic social and technological contexts of those relationships. 
For instance, when technology opens unexpected new areas of feasible 
conduct, both law and social norms may lag behind in their ability to con-
strain its socially undesirable aspects. Focused, public deliberation and in-
creased regulatory attention may be merited at least until social norms 
have developed to define the acceptable contours of such conduct. This 
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Article provides a more refined and inclusive framework for future re-
search and debate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As consumers, we all buy and borrow. For example, we buy everyday 
goods and services from some merchants. And, we borrow money for 
long-term investment, short-term liquidity, or simple convenience from 
others. Due primarily to technological change, the tools with which we 
buy have changed substantially in the past decade—and certainly in the 
half-century or more since most laws regulating consumer transactions 
came into force.  
Few areas of public policy have drawn fiercer debate in recent years 
than consumer protection. In part, these debates reflect the fact that we are 
all consumers, affected by this area of policy every day of our lives. In 
addition, vast sums of money are at stake. Many of the largest companies 
in the world appear on the other side of consumer transactions, selling us 
products, lending us money, or collecting our increasingly valuable per-
sonal data in exchange for online services.1 Most of all, technological de-
  
 1. See, e.g., Nancy Moran, Apple Falls to Fourth-Biggest U.S. Company by Market Value, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-03/apple-
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velopments have provoked upheaval in this area; the pervasiveness of mo-
bile technology and online commerce has unsettled social norms and ren-
dered regulatory regimes obsolete.2 Consumers may feel empowered and 
relieved at easier transacting3—but at the same time feel troubled and vic-
timized by the complex, take-them-or-leave-them terms imposed by 
online intermediaries that have so quickly become ubiquitous and inescap-
able.4 
No wonder, then, that consumer protection has provoked fierce pol-
icy debate on issues such as identity theft,5 online privacy,6 arbitration 
clauses,7 Americans’ accumulation of debt, and the unsavory practices 
sometimes used by would-be collectors of that debt.8 In response to these 
debates and developments, scholars, policymakers, and advocates devote 
increasing energy to this area of law. 
Despite this attention, confusion persists regarding what consumer 
protection really is or does. The realities of social norms and technological 
change have not been fully integrated into legal analyses of consumer 
transactions. Drawing on scholarship in the areas of technology, social 
norms, and law, this Article constructs a new model of the consumer pro-
tection ecosystem9 by contextualizing legal constraints within the lived 
realities of commercial relationships. This realist-inflected model situates 
  
is-now-fourth-biggest-u-s-company-by-market-value-chart (noting that Alphabet, Google’s parent 
company, Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon were the top four most valuable U.S. companies by market 
capitalization). 
 2. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, How Consumers Can Resist Companies’ Market Power, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 20, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/business/how-consumers-can-resist-compa-
nies-market-power.html. 
 3. See, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, FinTech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 63–
80 (2018) (describing financial technologies that have lowered transaction costs, while potentially 
imposing some new costs). 
 4. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Tech’s Frightful Five: They’ve Got Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/technology/techs-frightful-five-theyve-got-us.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Adam Janofsky, One Year After Equifax Breach: Criminal Charges, New State 
Laws and Lost Chances, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-
year-after-equifax-breach-criminal-charges-new-state-laws-and-lost-chances-1536334479 (describ-
ing regulatory efforts in the aftermath of theft of almost 148 million individuals’ personal information 
by major credit rating agency). 
 6. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Pri-
vacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-pri-
vacy-law.html. 
 7. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465–66 (2015) (upholding class ac-
tion waiver in arbitration agreement). 
 8. See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Who Snatched My Car? Wells Fargo Did, NPR (Aug. 2, 2017, 5:47 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/02/541182948/who-snatched-my-car-wells-fargo-did (noting that 
Wells Fargo enrolled approximately 490,000 auto loan customers for unneeded and duplicative auto 
insurance, leading to many defaults and repossessions of cars); Stacy Cowley, Debt Collectors’ Abuses 
Prompt Consumer Agency to Propose New Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), www.ny-
times.com/2016/07/28/business/dealbook/debt-collectors-abuses-prompt-consumer-agency-to-pro-
pose-new-rules.html. 
 9. Ecosystem can be defined as “the complex of a community of organisms and its environ-
ment functioning as an ecological unit.” Ecosystem, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/ecosystem (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). In this context, as the model shows, it in-
cludes the constraints operating on both merchants and consumers who might wish to engage in a 
particular action or behavior. See also infra Part II.C (discussing rationale for the model). 
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consumer law amid other factors affecting those engaging in commerce. 
The model serves as a theoretical basis for an integrated and nuanced con-
sideration of the different parts of what has been known as “consumer pro-
tection” (itself a problematic term10). The model builds on the realist intu-
itions that motivate much advocacy work both for and against current laws 
and policies, and considers the distinct types of constraints relevant to the 
regulation of consumer commercial relationships.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the premises of the 
model and lays out its basic features. This model relies on three different 
types of constraints on consumer commercial transactions: legal, tech-
nical, and social. “Legal constraints” are produced by laws, the remedies 
available for their breach, and the capacity of the institutions charged with 
enforcing them.11 Actions not deterred by adequate legal constraints are 
“legally feasible” actions. “Technical constraints” are those that are im-
possible due to the current state of technology, or possible but too expen-
sive to be feasibly implemented.12 Actions not subject to such constraints 
are “technically feasible.” “Social constraints” depend on social attitudes; 
they prohibit actions that cannot be successfully hidden and that, when 
publicly known, will draw condemnation and have high reputational con-
sequences.13 Actions that can either be hidden or would not bring social 
opprobrium if discovered are “socially feasible.” 
Under this model, the set of “permitted actions” in consumer com-
mercial relationships consists of everything not effectively barred by legal, 
technical, or social constraints. It is from this set of permitted actions that 
consumers and merchants choose when they engage in commerce.14 Ac-
tions outside the set of permitted actions are, in effect, not possible; con-
sumers are “protected” from such actions, even if they would otherwise 
prefer them.  
The model examines the exogenous factors that constrain parties 
from engaging in behavior they would otherwise prefer to take. The 
model’s analytical framework looks to the experienced constraints on the 
participants in relationships rather than merely legal constraints. In the 
same way social scientists have demonstrated that “order without law” can 
arise by virtue of complex social forces and technologists have argued that 
“code is law” because software code regulates software users’ conduct, 
  
 10. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Part II.A.1. For a high-level summary of the consumer law regime, see JOHN A. 
SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 6–8 (4th ed. 2013). 
 12. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 13. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 14. The model adopts the realist, “law-in-action,” orientation of scholars such as Stuart Ma-
cauley. See generally Stewart Macaulay & Elizabeth Mertz, New Legal Realism and the Empirical 
Turn in Law, in 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL 
PRACTICE (Elizabeth Mertz et al. eds., 2016). The core commitment of such an approach is to develop 
policy based on an empirical, social science-influenced, practical consideration of the nature and effect 
of legal tools such as contracts.  
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this Article identifies nonlegal constraints that “regulate” the conduct of 
those engaged in consumer transactions.15 
The analogy of legal constraints to social constraints, or to code and 
other technologically based constraints, is not perfect. Actors may feel and 
behave differently in the face of social versus legal constraints—some will 
be more constrained by one than the other.16 Still, each type of constraint 
can effectively deter an action, any time, for any actor. For the purposes 
of policy analysis, that deterrence is important regardless of how it is ob-
tained.  
This model does not rely on any particular views on, or justifications 
for, the regulation of consumer commercial relationships. Indeed, the 
model could be used to argue that nonlegal tools provide sufficient con-
straints, and market actors should be uninhibited by law. Alternatively, the 
model could serve as the basis for an argument that more radical legal in-
tervention is required—particularly in times of disruptive technological 
advances that render existing regulatory regimes outdated. Either way, this 
model provides a better tool for developing tailored policy approaches and 
for considering the type and intensity of constraint most appropriate under 
given circumstances.17 Thus, while the model itself is descriptive, it has 
normative implications for policy in the realm of consumer commercial 
relationships.  
Debates about consumer law and policy tend to turn on whether, with 
respect to a particular form of behavior, “the market” is working or will 
work properly. If not, then legal intervention is thought to be necessary; if 
  
 15. My model is deeply influenced by many of the influential observations made by Lawrence 
Lessig, both in his essay The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG. STUDS. 661, 661–63 (1998), and in his 
seminal work CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Even more directly, I have drawn 
from the excellent reworking of these ideas in the intellectual property arena by Harry Surden. See 
Harry Surden, Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 135, 136–
43 (2013). The work of Robert Ellickson is of course fundamental as well to any work on law and 
social norms and has influenced this work deeply. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: 
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 126, 127 (1994).  
 16. It is widely recognized that there are salient differences in the way law functions as opposed 
to other forms of limitation, different forms of responses to legal constraints as opposed to other forms 
of constraint (including code, technological cost, reputational sanction, etc.). James Grimmelman, 
Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1721–24 (2005) (outlining different “modalities” 
of regulation, including law, code, architecture, etc.). “Legal consciousness” and “legal culture” are 
two ways that “law and society” scholars have thought about the distinctiveness of law and legal force 
as opposed to other forms of power and control, both from the perspective of the regulator and the 
regulated. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 884, 888 (1988) 
(discussing analogies and distinctions between law and other forms of social “discipline”); Laura Beth 
Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About Law 
and Street Harassment, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1055, 1055–56 (2008) (discussing how certain groups 
perceive the role of law in their affairs); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal 
Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663, 1663–64 (1989) (provid-
ing seminal discussion of literature on “legal consciousness”). 
 17. Thus, as discussed further below, see infra note 93 and accompanying text, the model itself 
should not be read as an endorsement of the rather loaded, traditional concept of “consumer protec-
tion,” which implicitly and narrowly conceives of the policy goal as “protecting” consumers from 
merchants. The term consumer protection is preserved only because “consumer law” is too narrow, as 
it focuses solely on legal constraints; the more accurate and neutral “policies affecting consumer com-
mercial relationships” is too cumbersome. 
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so, then the market should be trusted and left alone. Advocates for regula-
tion focus on particular, perceived market failures and call for intrusive 
legal solutions. Opponents of regulation stress the general reliability of the 
market’s resource allocations as well as the expenses of regulation.18 De-
bates between these competing normative perspectives are important, but 
all of these debates rely on underlying theories of consumer and merchant 
behavior that need more examination. This Article implicitly urges that the 
dichotomy of “law versus markets” is unsatisfactory. The scholarship on 
consumer law and commerce lacks a general framework for conceiving 
how laws and markets alike interact with other factors that influence the 
consumer commerce ecosystem over time—in particular, social and tech-
nical factors. This Article begins to fill the gaps in the existing literature 
by proposing that we include a pragmatically driven emphasis on the func-
tional constraints on merchants and consumers in their commercial eco-
system. The model at the heart of this Article considers the constraints—
social, technical, and legal—that override what would otherwise be the 
market preferences of the consumer and merchant engaging in a consumer 
transaction. This perspective is novel and important. It may be implicit in 
some existing accounts, but a goal of this Article is to make explicit what 
has been implicit. The theoretical foundation of consumer protection af-
fects policy making, and only when laid out explicitly in detail can the 
foundation be critiqued and refined. 
Social and technical factors are not entirely separate from either law 
or markets (nor are law and markets analytically distinct phenomena). Ra-
ther, these factors are influenced by one another. It is true that social and 
technological factors can be, and are, considered “costs” to participants in 
transactions and analyzed as part of the market. So can the costs imposed 
by laws. Many valuable scholarly works implicitly take that approach.19 
But that broad conception of “market” can be both underinclusive and 
overinclusive. It is overinclusive because it lumps together so many dif-
ferent types of costs, short-term and long-term, reputational and monetary; 
it is underinclusive because it fails to give particularized attention to the 
innovations and the social changes that actually determine social and tech-
nological costs. Under existing legal as well as economic analyses, social 
  
 18. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE 
HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 43–44 (2004) (summarizing arguments of opponents of aggressive con-
sumer protection laws). In addition to policy arguments, of course both sides rely on the forms of raw 
power available to them: largely behind-the-scenes lobbying and political influence on the part of the 
opponents of regulation, and largely social organizing and the publicizing of particular stories of abuse 
on the part of consumer advocates. These political strategies are beyond the scope of this model, alt-
hough they are relevant aspects of how both legality and social acceptability is determined for partic-
ular practices. 
 19. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 26, 101, 191, 233, 237 (2012) (including a section on “market 
solutions” within each chapter); Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: The Limits of Market Disci-
pline in Consumer Markets, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (draft available at https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3239995) (providing a useful survey and analysis of liter-
ature on “market failures” focused on reputation).  
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and technological factors remain underappreciated aspects of the con-
sumer protection ecosystem. There is a value in considering these factors 
distinctly, rather than merely as lumped into an oversized and imprecise 
category of “market dynamics,” even if these factors are eventually rein-
corporated into an analysis that relies on economic methodologies (as most 
policy analyses ultimately do). 
Part III discusses some ramifications of the consumer protection 
model constructed in this Article. This model provides the basis for an 
argument that more attention should be paid to (a) the interdependence of 
legal and other forms of constraints on consumer commercial interactions, 
and (b) the assessment of changes over time. These two aspects are linked. 
Changes in one type of constraint—for instance, the development of a new 
area of technology, or a change in legal regime—will affect the others. 
Changes in technology may affect the social acceptability of an activity,20 
or the social acceptability of conduct may affect its legal permissibility. 
Or, less directly, changes in one type of constraint may expand or contract 
the set of permitted actions, which over time may add pressure to ease, or 
to tighten, other types of constraints. Policymakers should be aware of this 
interdependence as they consider regulatory strategies.21 In addition, the 
propensity for the balance of different constraints to change over time 
should be considered more consistently and systematically. Perhaps most 
importantly, when technology opens unexpected new areas of feasible 
conduct, both law and social norms may lag behind in their ability to con-
strain its socially undesirable aspects. Focused, public deliberation and in-
creased regulatory attention may be merited—at least until social norms 
have developed to define the acceptable contours of such conduct.  
  
 20. For example, technology seems to have shaped expectations of privacy, expectations con-
cerning the degree of formality required to complete a commercial transaction, and expectations con-
cerning dispute resolution. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Con-
tracting, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 248 (2016) (“PayPal's and eBay’s [Online Dispute Resolution] pro-
grams have garnered customer support because these programs allow customers to efficiently obtain 
remedies without the costs and hassles of traditional claims processes.”); Aaron Smith & Monica An-
derson, Online Shopping and E-Commerce, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/19/online-shopping-and-e-commerce/ (“[T]oday nearly as 
many Americans have made purchases directly through social media platforms as had engaged in any 
type of online purchasing behavior 16 years ago.”). 
 21. For instance, where effective constraints are already in place due to social forces or practical 
factors, regulatory action may be less necessary. This suggestion implicates a rich literature on the 
respective capacities of state versus market and other social forces. For instance, law and development 
scholars have explored the circumstances under which state actors or private actors might be best 
positioned to address a policy problem, and the circumstances in which particular forms or coordina-
tion might be required. See, e.g., David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in 
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) 
(discussing the historical academic literature on the dynamic of states versus markets in development); 
Pranab Bardhan, State Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature, 54 J. 
ECON. LIT. 862, 862 (2016) (surveying literature on the role of state versus other actors in develop-
ment). I am grateful to Martin Sybblis for helping me see the connection between this Article’s model 
and that literature. 
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Part IV considers potential objections to this model and addresses 
several ways in which it could be refined in future research. In the gener-
alized form presented here, the model lumps together constraints that may 
operate differently on various sorts of consumers, merchants, or transac-
tions. An online advance procured on a mobile device through an app that 
could be accessed by children may (or should) be subject to different con-
straints than a traditional loan applied for in-person by adults.22 Further 
work should refine and customize this model to fit each individual situa-
tion. It should be revisited to accommodate each point in time, each type 
of merchant or consumer, and each type of commercial transaction or re-
lationship. 
This aspect of the model underscores a broader principle concerning 
the law and policy of consumer commercial relationships, which is too 
often forgotten or neglected: there are unlikely to be one-size-fits-all anal-
yses or conclusions in this area. To the contrary, to develop appropriate 
policies we must pursue refined and layered consideration of consumers, 
the merchants, and the commercial relationships they seek. Additionally, 
we must consider the changes in the social, technical, and legal contexts 
of those relationships. Accordingly, this Article endeavors to provide a 
framework for considering the comprehensive sociolegal and technologi-
cal context in which consumers and merchants transact. 
I. A MODEL OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM 
A. The Model 
This Part lays out the basic premises and structure of the consumer 
protection ecosystem model. This model emphasizes that consumer pro-
tection, as experienced by participants in consumer commerce, has a scope 
that is delineated not just by governing law but also by the actual feasibility 
of particular actions23—both as a technical matter (i.e., the tools to engage 
in the transaction are reasonably available24) and as a social matter 
(i.e., the activities are socially acceptable). As discussed further below, 
this Article does not argue or analyze whether or not participants should 
  
 22. The problem of children engaging in unauthorized financial transactions for a caregiver’s 
phone has already caused problems for major technology companies. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt & Brian 
X. Chen, Apple to Refund App Store Purchases Made Without Parental Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/technology/government-and-apple-settle-childrens-
app-purchase-inquiry.html. 
 23. For the concept of an “effective scope” of laws, see Surden, supra note 15 which, distin-
guishes effective scope from positive scope and provides a theoretical framework. Professor Surden 
explored similar ideas in his prior work, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1605–
10 (2007). 
 24. For a similarly broad definition of “technology,” see, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as 
Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 85 (2013) (“[T]he term ‘technology’ can . . . be defined more 
broadly as ‘useful knowledge about how to produce things at low cost.” (quoting WILLIAM EASTERLY, 
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE 
TROPICS 150 (2001)). As explained further below in Subsection 3, my definition of “technically fea-
sible” actions includes the cost of the relevant tools or actions. 
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or should not be barred from particular activities. There is a range of rea-
sonable views on such questions, and this model does not force a choice 
because it can accommodate that entire range. This model is limited to the 
descriptive issues of what consumer protection is, what is actually pro-
tected, and what happens to that protection when the world changes. 
 
Figure 1. 
The model may be laid out as follows. Start with the universe of all 
possible actions that participants might take regarding a consumer com-
mercial relationship. These actions include: (1) the communications be-
tween the parties in the process of advertising and negotiation, including 
disclosures, conditions, and warranties; (2) the actions taken entering into 
the transaction, including indications of consent and agreement; (3) the 
actions taken to comply with or enforce the terms of the transaction, in-
cluding payment, delivery, repossession, foreclosure, or other means of 
pursuing relief upon default; and (4) the various ancillary actions such as 
the later commercial use of information gained in an earlier interaction 
(e.g., sale of customer information to a data broker). These are the actions 
under consideration by the model. The entire inside area of the perimeter 
rectangle of Figure 1 represents the universe of such actions.25 
1. Legal Constraints 
First, consider the set of such actions that are legally feasible (as la-
beled in Figure 1 above). Legal feasibility refers to actions that fall afoul 
of enforced legal prohibitions and bring penalties sufficient to deter parties 
from engaging in them. The boundaries of this area represent the existing 
body of legal constraints on actions that can be taken in consumer com-
mercial relationships. 
  
 25. The size of the respective areas of the Venn diagram are not drawn to any scale. Future 
research could estimate and render some of the areas proportionately to one another, though such 
estimates would remain somewhat speculative, as explained in the rest of this Part of the Article. In 
any case, the insights of the model laid out in this Article can be understood from the model as depicted 
here. 
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Legal constraints can be conceived broadly, including ex ante regu-
lation as well as ex post enforcement actions by private litigants and public 
officials. Legal constraints include a large body of law and regulation at 
the federal and state levels. Relevant laws include not just substantive lia-
bility rules but also rules concerning jurisdiction, standing, remedies, and 
so on, which are integral parts of the legal regime in place at a given time. 
Legal constraints in this model also include the institutions—agencies, 
courts, lawyers, and others26—that are responsible for the determination, 
evaluation, or resolution of legal rights and disputes. Note that while this 
model is one of “consumer protection,” which implies protection from a 
consumer’s commercial counterparties, merchants are not the only partic-
ipants subject to restriction. Consumers are barred from taking certain ac-
tions, too, out of concern for merchants or, paternalistically, to protect con-
sumers from themselves.27 
For an action to be legally feasible, it must either (1) not be prohibited 
by law (defined broadly as any law or regulation, at any jurisdictional 
level, to which the party is subject); or (2) not be subject to effective en-
forcement, whether because violations are difficult to detect, because pen-
alties are insufficiently likely to be imposed, or because the penalties are 
insufficiently severe, when imposed, to actually deter the prohibited con-
duct. 
Prohibition is not enough on its own. A party may be prohibited from 
taking certain otherwise-profitable actions under governing law, but if pro-
hibitions are not enforced, or the sanctions are low, the rules are unlikely 
to deter the action. For example, scholars have noted that banks foreclos-
ing on homeowners who are in default frequently retain contractors who 
have allegedly committed a wide variety of illegal acts without facing 
meaningful sanction.28 Such prohibited, but undeterred, “bad behavior” is 
a primary focus of consumer policy analysis. Fierce debates revolve 
around the availability of statutory penalties, attorney’s fees, class actions, 
  
 26. For instance, state and federal lawmakers; regulators such as the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, state attorneys general; public interest organizations; the 
private bar; and judges. Consumer law is effectively surveyed in RICHARD M. ALDERMAN & DEE 
PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW (2019). 
 27. Much of consumer law and policy is driven by paternalistic concern for consumers mis-
judging situations—making decisions adversely affecting their own welfare in ways thought ineffi-
cient or unjust. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 18, at 160–98; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1255, 1347 (2002); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 
1316 (2013) (“The metagoals of consumer law include consumer decisional autonomy in the market-
place; market transactions that optimize consumer welfare; and intraconsumer fairness, particularly 
for disadvantaged consumers.” (citations omitted)). Of course, as noted elsewhere, there are other 
justifications, including reducing externalities imposed on society as a result of particular transactions, 
and correcting perceived distributive problems. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 4, 26; 
PETERSON, supra note 18 at 200–30 (citing various justifications of regulation and “social costs” of 
high debt); Engel & McCoy, supra, at 1262 (noting distributive justice and externality concerns in 
mortgage lending).  
 28. See, e.g., Christopher K. Odinet, Banks, Break-Ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclo-
sure, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155, 1157–60 (2016). 
2019] THE COMSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM 45 
and other devices intended to aid injured consumers.29 Legal prohibitions 
often act as true constraints only when paired with these heightened sanc-
tions and enforcement structures. 
As with other constraints, legal constraints do not usually circum-
scribe actions as definitively as the clear line circumscribing this area in 
the diagram might suggest. Prohibition and enforcement, and ultimately 
deterrence, will be matters of degree. This important fact is considered 
further in Part IV. 
2. Social Constraints 
Second, consider the set of socially feasible actions (as labeled in 
Figure 1), those (1) for which public responsibility cannot be avoided, and 
(2) which, if known, would not be considered so contrary to governing 
norms of social behavior that a party wouldn’t undertake them.30 The first 
element acknowledges that there are many actions that parties take behind 
closed doors that affect consumer commercial relationships but that are 
unlikely to ever be revealed. Some actions might draw social opprobrium 
if known, but parties engage in them because the risk of disclosure is low. 
The second element acknowledges that it is society’s reaction that deter-
mines the level of deterrence produced by a given norm.  
As with legal acceptability, it is not the case that an action is either 
socially acceptable or not—this is not a purely dichotomous condition. 
Some actions are vaguely distasteful but profitable enough to be worth the 
reputational cost. A rational merchant might decide to “hold its nose” and 
partake in such actions anyway. Such actions are socially feasible under 
this model because the model focuses on actions that are actually deterred 
by the threat of reputational harm.31 
Social science literature on reputation has emphasized its power par-
ticularly in “close-knit” societies.32 Drawing from these insights, legal 
  
 29. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 3, at 83 (discussing and collecting sources discussing statutory 
damages); id. at 72 (discussing and collecting sources concerning class actions and consumer protec-
tion). 
 30. On what is meant by “norms,” see ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 127. Basically, they are 
“rules that emanate . . . from social forces.” Id. In the social world studied by Ellickson (ranchers in 
Shasta County), the norms could be discerned from the fact that ranchers described them to him, that 
they actually abided by them, and that they “regularly punished, with gossip and ultimately with vio-
lent self-help, ranchers who failed to control their cattle.” Id. at 130. Violent self-help is less common 
in the consumer context, but gossip in the form of reputational attacks on the Internet (sometimes in 
“violent” language) is a similar means of enforcing such norms. 
 31. Such actions could be mapped as close to the edge of the relevant circle, near what should 
be imagined as a blurry line at the edge of each oval. 
 32. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 143, 166. 
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scholars have suggested that formal legal sanctions take on greater im-
portance where social bonds are weak.33 The classic example is the weaker 
social bonds of large cities as opposed to small towns.34  
These insights are applicable to consumer transactions. Earlier work 
on consumer commerce has confirmed that traditional brick-and-mortar 
firms care about reputation among what often amounts to the “small town” 
of their customer base.35 They are more responsive to consumer com-
plaints and interests than would be expected if their primary concern were 
only legal sanctions (e.g., warranty claims).36 These firms have long sup-
ported organizations such as the Better Business Bureau, to demonstrate 
and bolster their credibility with consumers.37 Today, large and stable 
firms doing business online attend to their reputation in a similar fashion.38 
Established businesses, reliant on repeat customers and on reputation, are 
sensitive to social constraints—although, they too occasionally violate so-
cial norms and legal rules.39 
  
 33. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 39 n.15 (“[L]ack of a prospective long-term future 
relationship makes disputants less likely to resolve their differences without the help of third parties, 
and hence more likely to resort to legal and political action.”); id. at 94 (providing a summary chart). 
 34. Id. at 253. 
 35. Id. at 141–43 (discussing academic literature). 
 36. Id.; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443–50 (2010) examining the impact of market forces, including reputational 
concerns, on firms’ decisions to redesign products); id. at 1449 (“[L]arge firms tend to be especially 
concerned about their reputation for safety because they often offer multiple product lines and have 
long time horizons.”). There is a much broader literature in the business world concerning the im-
portance of reputation for most traditional firms. See, e.g., Eugene W. Anderson, Claes Fornell, & 
Sanal K. Mazvancheryl, Customer Satisfaction and Shareholder Value, 68 J. MARKETING 172, 183 
(2004) (finding a positive association between reputation with customers and shareholder value). Anne 
Fleming has documented various relevant practices among “fringe financiers” in twentieth century 
New York. Compare ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS: A CENTURY OF FRINGE FINANCE 158–59 
(2018) (discussing the effective use of “grassroots protest” against Harlem merchants), with id. at 175 
(noting the difficulty of enforcing consumer protective regulations or applying social pressure to “fly-
by-night” merchants and lenders, including those represented by “door-to-door” sellers), and id. at 
145 (noting that consumers seeking remedies against door-to-door sellers of goods faced the often 
insuperable barrier of having to “track[ ] down a door-to-door seller to serve notice of the lawsuit”). 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 150 (discussing the Better Business Bureau and noting its limitations); JAKE 
HALPERN, BAD PAPER: CHASING DEBT FROM WALL STREET TO THE UNDERWORLD 103–05 (2014) 
(discussing ease of appeasing the Better Business Bureau’s complaint process without substantive 
compliance with regulations). 
 38. CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 186–87 (2017) (noting that critique of American Ex-
press’s use of customer data caused a change in course). 
 39. See infra note 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the example of Wells Fargo). My 
treatment of this subject is, by necessity, brief. The issue deserves fuller treatment. There are some 
countervailing factors that might lead established companies to be more abusive of consumers. For 
instance, companies under distress will discount potential future business very aggressively and, thus, 
may be more willing to abuse current customers at the cost of future business. Or merchants may treat 
customers less well if they know those customers are “locked-in,” i.e., reluctant to switch to a new, 
unfamiliar merchant unless extremely unhappy. See, e.g., DAVID YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION: 
HOW CORPORATE LAW IMPEDES AMERICAN PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2018) (discuss-
ing empirical evidence of such lock-in). 
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By contrast, one might expect reputational constraints to be signifi-
cantly loosened in a less close-knit commercial environment.40 In that re-
spect, the Internet is far bigger than the biggest city. The Internet lowers 
the barriers to entry of any new actor, and permits anyone, anywhere in 
the world, to engage in business with online consumers across the globe. 
Many transactions are now completed with one-off merchant counterpar-
ties about whom the consumer has little information.41 Also, current U.S. 
business law permits cheap, easy, low-disclosure creation of limited lia-
bility entities.42 Some merchants (e.g., some shadowy online lenders) may 
be essentially disposable entities, used to engage in activities that their ac-
tual (hidden) principals might not want to undertake publicly in their own 
names.43 Because these actors care little about their reputation, social 
forces only marginally impact them. Disposable entities can be easily 
abandoned if negative public opinion overtakes them and hurts their busi-
ness prospects. Then, the same business can be reborn under a different 
name with a reputationally “clean slate.” For such entities, the realm of 
socially feasible actions may be quite broad.44  
  
 40. Notice, however, that “close-knit” does not always refer to geographical closeness at a par-
ticular time. For example, Ellickson provides an extended discussion of whaling norms, maintained 
despite the relatively far-flung activities of the various participants in the industry. ELLICKSON, supra 
note 15, at 191–206. But, of course, the parties have to see benefits in cooperation, and other conditions 
have to be met for such order to emerge. 
 41. I do not mean to suggest this is an entirely new problem; lenders have long used numerous 
evasions—including changing names and locations as needed—to escape regulatory and social sanc-
tion. Professor Fleming provides numerous, rich accounts of lenders using different corporate identi-
ties and (pretended) location to evade regulations and obscure the actors actually behind consumer 
lending transactions. See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 36, at 27, 56. But the problem seems particularly 
acute in the online world, where the marketplace is global, and masking identity is very easy. 
 42. See, e.g., CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 533–37 (2017) (presenting basic aspects and history of limited liability com-
panies (LLCs) under modern business entity law); Patricia Cohen, Need to Hide Some Income? You 
Don’t Have to Go to Panama, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/busi-
ness/need-to-hide-some-income-you-dont-have-to-go-to-panama.html (noting minimal Delaware 
LLC disclosure laws). 
 43. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 28 (noting that some consumers intentionally select 
merchants at the lower end of the market, but may not take account of lower-quality contract design 
features selected by “sellers” who are “undeterred (or less deterred) by the threat of a reputational 
penalty”); HALPERN, supra note 37, at 168 (recounting concerns of New York state regulator that 
companies would simply “reopen somewhere else under a different name,” to obtain lighter regula-
tion); id. at 221 (providing examples of the rapid closing and reopening of businesses under new name 
or in new location); PETERSON, supra note 18, at 135 (“[B]ecause entry and exit costs are low for high-
cost creditors, the market is inundated with fly-by-night businesses that make only minor investments 
in reputational capital and other sunk costs. Because many high-cost lenders do not invest time and 
effort in building solid reputations, they have little to fear from word-of-mouth criticism.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 44. BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 165 (noting that problems “in the subprime mortgage market” 
including the lack of “repeat business, as a single borrower takes few mortgage loans and a relatively 
long time passes between loans,” as well as “the opening of the market [by the rise of securitization] 
to fly-by-night originators with little reputation to lose and insufficient incentives to build a reputa-
tion”); see, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 27, at 1289–90 (contrasting “[b]anks and thrifts,” which 
are “community institutions with valuable reputations,” with “[p]redatory lenders [who] are less con-
cerned about their reputations because they are simply conduits, not community institutions,” and who 
“can readily dissolve and re-emerge in the same communities under different names”); id. at 1353 
(discussing “fly-by-night operations” of some predatory lenders, who have “little capitalization” and 
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Finally, due to technological developments, online merchants may be 
able to prevent consumers from becoming aware of certain practices. For 
instance, consumers have not yet caught on that merchants are using ad-
vanced technological tools to set pricing, anticipate consumer needs and 
desires, and otherwise leverage Big Data to ensure that transactions take 
place on the most advantageous terms possible for the merchant.45  
On the other hand, new forms of social constraint have begun to 
emerge that may affect this state of affairs. Social media and online review 
sites may be able to provide some “bite” to reputation—even in a changed 
world.46 These online platforms can serve effectively as forms of pervasive 
public surveillance of businesses. How best to cultivate, or constrain, these 
and other policy tools deserves further exploration.47  
In sum, social constraints may have diminished in some arenas—par-
ticularly one-off, purely online transactions with unknown or anonymous 
counterparties—and thus, new areas of permitted action may have opened; 
in others, the realm of social acceptability has narrowed thanks to the pub-
lic scrutiny facilitated by the Internet.48 But in all cases, it is an important 
factor affecting merchant and consumer behavior, and one that merits par-
ticularized policy attention. 
3. Technical Constraints 
Third, consider the set of technically feasible actions (as labeled in 
Figure 1), which are those that, as of a particular moment in time, are 
(1) technologically possible and (2) can be deployed in a cost-effective 
  
“can dissolve and reincorporate, sometimes in other states, practically overnight”); cf. Engel & 
McCoy, supra note 27, at 1296 (“Some banks and thrifts, whose direct lending is legitimate, have 
subsidiaries and affiliates that employ predatory lending practices.”). Professor Odinet has provided 
an additional example of when reputational constraints can be ineffective: when the market has col-
lapsed and there is no need to worry about obtaining future business. See CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, 
FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN 
AMERICA 55 (2019) (“[T]here was very little market incentive for servicers of subprime [mortgage] 
loans to do a great job for reputational reasons. One would think that having a good name on Wall 
Street would lead to future servicing businesses. However, in the wake of the crash this was simply 
not the case. . . . Because the business model of servicing subprime loans was essentially headed down 
the toilet, there was no reason to compete for future business—and thus no real reason to strive for 
excellent in servicing the loans that were quickly going into default.”). This issue is discussed in 
greater detail at infra Part IV.A, where I acknowledge that a path for future work is to distinguish what 
laws and policies might be appropriate for different types of merchants, in part based on their different 
levels of responsiveness to sanctions, including reputational/social sanctions. 
 45. Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1311, 1347–49 (2015). 
 46. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 569–71 
(2016). The potential for such tools was foreseen by ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 285 writing in 1991 
that “recent advances in data processing make it easier to store and retrieve truthful public-record 
information about a person’s previous failures to cooperate. . . . [T]he improved circulation of accurate 
reputational information can deter fly-by-night opportunism.” 
 47. See, e.g., Arbel, supra note 19. Professor Arbel provides a skeptical view of the effective-
ness of technology-driven reputation constraints absent regulatory intervention, and proposes convinc-
ing “fixes” for this market failure. 
 48. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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manner in consumer transactions. The set excludes acts that are not tech-
nologically possible (e.g., reading your mind to assess your willingness to 
repay a loan you have applied for); or that are possible but too expensive 
or inconvenient to be worth it (e.g., interviewing your friends and family 
to ascertain your intentions regarding repayment). 
Stated differently, the boundaries—the circumference—of that el-
lipse represent technical constraints on commerce.49 These constraints 
have nothing to do with the legality of actions, or the state of the law; nor 
do they involve social acceptability and the reputational effects of engag-
ing in a course of action. Instead, these constraints involve only whether a 
market participant, independent of regulation and social context, might 
find them cost-effective pursuits. Unlike legal and social constraints, tech-
nical constraints may not even be recognized as constraints until technol-
ogy has already overcome them—in other words, until technology shifts 
the boundaries of what we consider “possible,” we might not have realized 
what we were missing. Perhaps the world would be better if more of those 
technical constraints were surmounted. This is plausible with respect to 
many forms of technical limitation. But even desirable shifts have com-
plex and important implications for policy. 
The category of technical constraints is intended to be broad. It is 
helpful to consider not just “advanced” technological actions, such as pro-
curing Big Data about consumer behavior on the Internet. Rudimentary 
technologies—many of which have been around for decades, such as tel-
emarketing, bar codes, and even adhesion contracts—remain relevant 
technologies in setting the scope of feasible acts in consumer commerce.50 
Often, technologies developed for other purposes end up having unin-
tended but important effects on commercial transacting. For example, ad-
vances in data storage and computer networking have provided merchants 
and consumers with greater access to banking records (such as images of 
  
 49. The use of the term “technical” at many points in this Article is intended to indicate that 
some of the constraints might not be what is colloquially thought of as “technological” but rather 
natural/physical, in nature. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 24, at 85 (defining “technology” broadly to 
include production knowledge). Globalization, for instance, can be thought of as a loosening of “tech-
nological constraints” in the form of increasingly more efficiently organized long-distance commercial 
networks (it also, of course, relies on relaxed legal constraints). Professor Surden has provided a more 
thoroughly elaborated analytical framework concerning “non-legal regulatory devices”; for instance, 
he uses the more general term “structural constraints” to mean roughly what I term “technical con-
straints,” and then he subdivides that category in interesting ways. See generally Surden, supra note 
23, at 1606–08; see also Surden, supra note 15, at 138 (“This Article proposes the term ‘Technological 
Cost’ to capture how activities can be implicitly constrained by limitations inherent to technological 
processes of the past.”). 
 50. Christopher G. Bradley, Disrupting Secured Transactions, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 965, 1028 
n.177 (2019) (discussing importance of bar code); Bradley, supra note 3, at 78–79 (noting that tech-
nological changes can take considerable time to impact markets and social norms). It has been aptly 
said that “technological revolutions do not get interesting socially until they are boring technologi-
cally.” Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. ONLINE 35, 47 (2014) (citing Clay Shirky, How Social Media Can Make History, TED (June 
2019), http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cellphones_twitter_facebook_can_make_his-
tory/transcript (stating that online “tools don't get socially interesting until they get technologically 
boring”)). 
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deposited checks and payment histories); ease of access, in turn, has had 
numerous important effects on the financial system, for good or ill.51  
Finally, in this category, there is a special case that should be consid-
ered: an action that is technically possible for one party but is easily coun-
termanded by technology available to the other party.52 An example is the 
pop-up advertisements generated by Internet websites.53 These ads were 
sufficiently effective as to become widespread, but they also caused great 
annoyance to consumers, who commonly found themselves unable to 
close websites because of an endless proliferation of pop-ups. Then, block-
ers of these ads were developed and became widespread, such that pop-up 
ads may no longer be considered a technically feasible option because they 
are so widely and easily thwarted.54 As will be discussed in later sections 
of this Article, consideration of such countermeasures is a way in which 
this model can be refined for the analysis of particular fact scenarios. 
B. Reading the Model 
The fundamental principle of this model, stated in plain language, is 
this: Only if an act is technically, legally, and socially feasible will a par-
ticipant engage in it. Consumers are effectively “protected” from all other 
acts. 
This principle can be represented as in Figure 2 below. Let legally 
feasible actions be defined as the area FL, technically feasible actions be 
defined as the area FT, and socially feasible actions be defined as the area 
FS. The scope of permitted actions is defined as the area at the intersection 
of these three types of feasibility: PA. In other words, as shown below, 
PA = FL ∧ FT ∧ FS.  
  
 51. Bradley, supra note 3, at 72, 92–94 (discussing literature on effect of technologically teth-
ered consumer finance activity on those lacking digital literacy). 
 52. Some of the relevant issues are discussed well by Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of 
Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1152–53, 1156, 1220 (2006). 
 53. See, e.g., John Herrman, Google Chrome Now Blocks Irksome Ads. That’s a Good Thing, 
Right?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/business/media/google-
chrome-ad-block.html (describing Internet advertising that is easily thwarted by ad-blocking soft-
ware). 
 54. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 70–
71 (2014) (discussing antitracking technologies); Klint Finley, Google's New Ad Blocker Changed 
The Web Before It Even Switched On, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/google-chrome-ad-blocker-change-web/ (noting that a 2016 survey 
“found that about 26 percent of web users had installed ad-blockers on their computers,” and that 
Google Chrome’s default blocking of some pop-up ads may be intended to stop users from installing 
more aggressive products that threaten Google’s own advertising revenue); Herrman, supra note 53 
(describing Google’s imposition of default pop-up detection and blocking software in its Chrome 
browsers).  




The most obvious and important observation emerging from Fig-
ures 1 and 2 is that consumers are protected by social, technical, and legal 
constraints. This model is a realist one because it focuses on the broader 
social and practical realities, wherein legal prohibitions and institutions 
play important but limited roles.55  
A simple example from recent headlines: It is technically possible to 
open bank accounts for large numbers of customers without their permis-
sion, as Wells Fargo has admitted doing.56 But it is both unlawful and so-
cially unacceptable to do so. As noted, however, social and legal sanctions 
deter behavior only when the behavior is likely to become known. Wells 
Fargo’s conduct went undetected for a considerable length of time, and 
those engaging in this conduct may have assumed that it would remain 
undiscovered. Because Wells Fargo’s conduct was revealed and has been 
heavily sanctioned, future market participants are likely to be deterred for 
both social and legal reasons.57 
The key premise of this realist model of the consumer protection eco-
system is that, whether recognized or not, technical and social constraints 
form a crucial part of the boundary of the effective scope of actions that 
  
 55. This insight has been demonstrated amply in the work of social science-oriented scholars, 
see, e.g., infra note 36, but has not sufficiently been taken into account in consumer protection discus-
sions. 
 56. See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-
fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html?auth=login-email&login=email. 
 57. See id. (describing sanctions); Matt Egan, Wells Fargo's Scandals Are Hurting Its Bottom 
Line, CNN BUSINESS (July 13, 2018, 11:04 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/13/news/compa-
nies/wells-fargo-earnings-stock/index.html. 
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participants in consumer transactions may take at a given time. A con-
straint is a constraint.58 All forms of constraint constitute important aspects 
of “consumer protection.” 
This is not to say that each type of constraint operates in the same 
way. Technical constraints may take the form of an arms race or a cat-and-
mouse game as parties develop technical capacities that essentially cancel 
each other out—or at least dampen the effects of new tools.59 Violations 
of legal constraints may be subject to different norms or beliefs than tech-
nical ones. Willful, public violation of a legal constraint may be viewed in 
some cases as the product of an intentional and legitimate political or ex-
pressive act, and may even lead to legal change. Alternatively, such an 
action may be viewed with intensified social opprobrium because it is not 
only wrong but also illegal.60 Other nuances regarding these different con-
straints are discussed in Part IV.A below. This area is another aspect of the 
model that is ripe for refinement, particularly by interdisciplinary research. 
C. A Taxonomy of Consumer Commercial Actions and Constraints 
The model presented above permits a taxonomy of potential actions 
to be made, and allows for analysis of the relationship between these dif-
ferent constraints on consumer commerce. Figure 3 depicts the complex 
interrelationships among these constraints. Each area within the Venn di-
agram presents a distinct unit of analysis. I provide real-world examples 
of actions in each area below.  
 
Figure 3.  
  
 58. To put it in the famous words of proto-legal realist Oliver Wendell Holmes, these are all 
constraints that would operate on “the bad man.” See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897). 
 59. The law has been characterized, similarly, as a “tug of war,” as it is perceived to have gone 
too far in one direction or the other and as changing political tides take it one direction of another. 
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 11. 
 60. See supra note 15 and accompanying test (discussing “code as law”); see supra Part II.A.1. 
(discussing the literature on the special features of (il)legality as a particular type of constraint). 
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The areas within the Venn diagram are as follows: 
Area 1: Actions that are outside the bounds of legal, social, and 
technical feasibility.  
Area 2: Actions that are legal but neither socially acceptable 
nor technically feasible. 
Area 3: Actions that are socially acceptable and legal but are 
not technically feasible. 
Area 4: Actions that are legally and technically feasible but are 
not socially acceptable. 
Area 5: Actions that are socially acceptable but are neither le-
gally nor technically feasible. 
Area 6: Actions that are socially and technically feasible but are 
illegal. 
Area 7: Actions that are technically feasible but are neither so-
cially acceptable nor legal.  
Area 8: Actions that are legal, socially acceptable, and techni-
cally feasible.  
 
There is room for judgment in determining which area a given action 
falls in. There may be differences of opinion in whether a given action is 
actually socially acceptable (given the different communities that might 
be called upon to judge it), or legally feasible (given the varied legal re-
gimes and enforcement possibilities), or even technically feasible (given 
the degrees to which parties’ technical capacities might differ). But even 
if they are contestable, examples in each category helpfully illuminate the 
scope and variety of what this model includes. 
Area 1: Actions that are outside the bounds of legal, social, and tech-
nical feasibility.  
At first glance, this might seem to be a fanciful category. It is difficult 
to look prospectively and predict what will become feasible as a matter of 
later technical, legal, or social change. However, helpful examples can be 
found if searched for retrospectively and with the benefit of hindsight.  
A simple thought experiment helps give the category meaning. Con-
sider an advertiser who wishes to gain direct, near-real-time access to vast 
amounts of highly personal information about an individual and her 
friends. This advertiser wants the information to discover, for instance, the 
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week that the individual learns she is pregnant to sell her pregnancy-re-
lated products (and peddle her information to others).61 In the late 1990s 
or early 2000s, it would have been unlawful, socially unacceptable, and 
technically infeasible to do such a thing. However, such data-mining ac-
tivities are commonplace today thanks to a variety of legal, social, and 
technical changes.62 Now, such behavior may be in Area 8 (for better or 
worse). But not too long ago, it would have been in Area 1. It is difficult 
to predict what the next battlegrounds might be, but they may be as unpre-
dictable to us now as Big Data was a few decades ago. 
Area 2: Actions that are legal but neither socially acceptable nor 
 technically feasible. 
Again, it is difficult to propose plausible examples that are not cur-
rently technically feasible. However, one example is the use of credit re-
ports and credit scores in commonplace, small-scale commercial transac-
tions. Trade vendors such as plumbers or locksmiths often extend unse-
cured credit by providing services and receiving payment or invoicing the 
customer afterwards. While consumers expect their credit to matter for 
large purchases, they would resist a check in advance of a visit for a routine 
service call. Such checks would be legal, but likely socially unacceptable.  
These checks might not be technically feasible either, at least for 
small home repair businesses. It would be relatively expensive and cum-
bersome to perform a credit check over the phone prior to dispatching 
workers to each service call. Performing a check after the fact would be 
too late, because the call’s expense would have already been incurred.  
Thus, such a credit check, while lawful, would likely be both socially 
unacceptable and—for the moment—technically infeasible. One could, 
however, imagine this type of check becoming both more technically fea-
sible and socially acceptable in the future.  
Area 3: Actions that are socially acceptable and legal but are not 
 technically feasible. 
  
 61. See Sarah Gray, One Woman’s Attempt to Hide her Pregnancy from Big Data—It’s More 
Difficult Than You’d Expect, SALON (Apr. 29, 2014, 2:45 AM), https://www.sa-
lon.com/2014/04/28/one_womans_attempt_to_hide_her_pregnancy_from_big_data/ (noting that 
“[t]o marketers, the average Joe's online data is worth around 10 cents. However, a pregnant woman's 
data is worth fifteen times that: $1.50”). 
 62. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 
2012), https://nyti.ms/AyNgCY (discussing Target’s aggressive use of data procurement and analytics 
in determining pregnancy status of customers, but also noting Target’s sensitivity to the potential pub-
lic-relations risks and some potential legal risks of their strategies); Rachel Emma Silverman, Bosses 
Tap Outside Firms to Predict Which Workers Might Get Sick, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/ar-
ticles/bosses-harness-big-data-to-predict-which-workers-might-get-sick-1455664940 (last updated 
Feb. 18, 2016) (“Employee wellness firms and insurers are working with companies to mine data about 
the prescription drugs workers use, how they shop and even whether they vote, to predict their indi-
vidual health needs and recommend treatments.”). 
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These are actions that merchants and consumers are merely waiting 
for technology companies to facilitate. Drone-based product deliveries63 
and virtual-reality shopping64 (or even virtual fitting of clothes65) provide 
ready examples. These actions currently lie on the other side of the border 
of technical feasibility but may cross to our side soon. Once the technical 
solution is found, legal and social barriers are unlikely to influence adop-
tion (although whether they will catch on is a business question). 
Area 4: Actions that are legally and technically feasible but are not 
 socially acceptable.  
This category includes actions that are only constrained by social 
norms. Some might assume that the law would prohibit most socially un-
acceptable acts and that examples of this category would be hard to find. 
In fact, there are many. Consider when airline employees had a doctor 
dragged off an overbooked United Airlines flight after he had taken his 
seat. Passengers recorded his forcible removal and quickly posted those 
videos on social media.66 While the actions of the airline were technically 
feasible, and at least arguably in accord with governing law, the ensuing 
firestorm of bad publicity made clear that the act was over the bounds of 
social acceptability—and, in the age of mobile devices and viral videos, it 
could not be hidden from public view. As a reminder, the category of so-
cially permitted actions is defined to include actions that would draw dis-
approval if known, but that can be concealed. As this example shows, cer-
tain actions may be rendered more discoverable over time, particularly 
with the rise of social media, easy data-sharing, and camera-phones. Ac-
cordingly, the scope of acceptable actions may constrict. 
By contrast, some consumer protection experts are skeptical of the 
disciplining effects of reputation in the world of Big Data because compa-
nies can successfully mask their actions, divert consumer attention, and 
avoid criticism. For instance, retailers have become adept at masking their 
tailored, surveillance-based advertising and marketing efforts at just below 
the threshold of what consumers might find alarming.67 Some retailers 
seeking to determine optimal prices for profit maximization have pursued 
  
 63. Jeremy Lin & P.W. Singer, Meet China's Growing Fleet of Automated Delivery Drones, 
POPULAR SCIENCE (July 3, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/china-drone-deliveries (“Alibaba, China's 
largest e-commerce firm, is already making drone deliveries in Shanghai.”). 
 64. Anthony Soohoo, Walmart.com to Introduce New Home Shopping Features: 3D Virtual 
Shopping Tour and “Buy The Room”, WALLMART (June 27, 2018), https://corpo-
rate.walmart.com/newsroom/2018/06/27/walmart-com-to-introduce-new-home-shopping-features-
3d-virtual-shopping-tour-and-buy-the-room. 
 65. See 4D Movies Capture People in Clothing, Create Realistic Virtual Try-On, MAX PLANCK 
INST. FOR INTELLIGENT SYS. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.is.mpg.de/news/4d-movies-capture-people-
in-clothing-creating-realistic-virtual-try-on (discussing “ClothCap,” or “clothing capture” technology 
that uses video-obtained analysis of clothing data to assess sizing and fit). 
 66. Camila Domonoske, Passenger Forcibly Removed from United Flight, Prompting Outcry, 
NPR (Apr. 10, 2017, 12:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/04/10/523275494/passenger-forcibly-removed-from-united-flight-prompting-outcry. 
 67. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 45 at 1322, 1348 (offering the example of Target responding 
to criticism by masking its Big Data advertising to maintain it “under the threshold of awareness”).  
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highly technical, and privacy-invasive, strategies: “Mass retailers contin-
ually fine-tune their pricing algorithms through advanced behavioral data-
mining operations. They film customers’ in-store movements, compile 
loyalty card data, and conduct many randomized controlled trials that eas-
ily provide statistical significance across thousands of stores and millions 
of transactions.”68 Retailers using these or a panoply of other Big Data 
tools may eventually draw the ire of consumers—or, alternatively, be 
viewed as perfectly acceptable if privacy norms continue to erode.69 For 
now, these retailers’ actions remain unknown to, or poorly understood by, 
the general public, and are not socially constrained. 
A final point: as the diagram itself handily reflects, there is a shared 
border between this area and Area 8 (the actions that are legally, techno-
logically, and socially feasible). It may be the case that a way for a com-
pany to “game” the line between these two areas is to switch to a more 
socially acceptable practice after the fact and on a case-by-case basis, only 
for the benefit of customers who complain. Thus, as scholars have noted, 
businesses can use “the customer service department as a site of displaced 
bargaining about the less salient terms of adhesive contract,” such as ex-
orbitant late fees or interest charges.70 When such gambits are successful, 
businesses can be thought of as having successfully evaded constraint in 
all but the relatively few instances of customers challenging it. 
Area 5: Actions that are socially acceptable but are neither legally 
 nor technically feasible. 
One example of this type of action is in the sphere of online compar-
ison shopping and competition for provision of financial services. Re-
markably, price comparison platforms are often barred from gathering 
price information from merchants offering goods on the Internet both due 
to laws and due to technological obstacles erected by sellers of goods.71 
Similarly, “legacy” financial institutions have erected technical barriers 
and cited legal prohibitions to bar innovative financial services providers 
  
 68. Id. at 1322 (“Retailers track micro-behavioral patterns such as variations in consumers’ 
price sensitivity by item at different times in different stores and adju, st prices accordingly. Online 
retailers also selectively charge consumers higher prices by, for example, profiling operating systems 
and tracking purchase history.” (citations omitted)); id. at 1345 (“Using technology that shows where 
the eye is looking, retailers have determined where most consumers naturally look when they walk 
down an aisle . . . [R]etailers can anchor the consumer at a higher price so that subsequent items appear 
cheaper by comparison.”). 
 69. See generally id. at 1331–33. Professor Van Loo’s article is a fascinating compendium of 
examples of how technology has enabled all sorts of new forms of merchant behavior. 
 70. Van Loo, supra note 46, at 280 (discussing consumers who are likely to receive the superior 
treatment afford to “squeaky wheel” customers). I am grateful to Professor Van Loo for helping me 
see the relationship of this scholarship to business practices at the Area 4/Area 8 border. 
 71. See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 837 (2019) (“Coun-
terintuitively in the information age, businesses can block access to market information that exists 
openly on the web, such as Amazon’s or airlines’ prices. … Online sellers have used the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and other laws to forbid third parties from digitally collecting such 
information.” (internal footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 836–45 (describing the range of “legal and 
market battlegrounds” on which would-be new “digital intermediaries” have had to fight to obtain 
access to new markets). 
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from accessing customer account information; thus, they have hindered 
startup financial technology (FinTech) companies from competing with 
them.72 These technical and legal constraints hinder new competitors from 
activities that would otherwise be acceptable. 
A more controversial example of this category is merchants who 
would take actions adverse to some socially disfavored but legally pro-
tected part of the population—if they could readily distinguish members 
of that group. Such a merchant might not be subject to any social sanction 
in the area they are located or from the community of their customers. But 
implementing this policy would be illegal and would also present technical 
difficulties.73 Of course, some businesses might find a way of sorting po-
tential customers into the disfavored group. In that situation, where the 
discrimination is both technically and socially feasible, legal protection 
attains its greatest importance because it is the only remaining constraint. 
That situation falls in Area 6, considered immediately below. 
Area 6: Actions that are socially and technically feasible but are 
 illegal.  
This category includes actions that are prohibited by law but that the 
general public would not understand the abusiveness of, or would not con-
sider problematic because the law protects a socially disfavored part of the 
population (as in the last example above).  
This category also includes actions that are illegal but should not 
be—that is, actions prohibited by vestigial regulations that are in need of 
repeal. Some businesses in the “gig economy,” such as Uber and AirBnb, 
  
 72. See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA. 
L. REV. 232, 242–43 (2018) (describing barriers to entry imposed by “legacy” firms, including use of 
dominant market positions and of laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which were 
intended to protect customer data against misuse rather than protect banks from competition); id. at 
261–64 (noting antitrust implications of legacy firms’ conduct).  
 73. Consider discrimination on the basis of categories such as religion or sexual orientation that 
may be relatively difficult to detect in a particular customer. There are probably merchants (similar to 
the baker in the recent Supreme Court case, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights. 
Comm’n, who would discriminate against members of these various protected classes if possible, de-
spite such conduct being unlawful under federal, state, and local law(s). 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)). But 
such merchants often have no idea whether many of their customers fall into the class, and in most 
instances, no ready way of finding out. Such merchants are both legally and technically constrained 
from taking an action that—to them—would not be barred by social constraints or fear of reputational 
harm. This is an important example to reinforce a point emphasized below. See infra Part III.A. Social 
acceptability may constrain some but not all merchants in a community, and so to some degree the 
model’s analysis has to be customized to consider different subcommunities or simply different de-
grees of responsiveness to this form of constraint (which sometimes may be more and sometimes less 
cutting than legal constraints). Also, consider the party harmed by the merchant discussed here: It 
would be of limited comfort to the would-be customers in Masterpiece Cakeshop to tell them that 
while the business they tried to purchase a wedding cake from had the technical ability to discriminate 
against them, many businesses (their local paint supply store or tire shop or whatever) would be con-
strained from doing so by being unable to discern their sexual orientation in time to refuse to deal with 
them. Thus the type of transaction and the characteristics of the protected consumers may vary, too, 
in ways worth disaggregating in order to reach good policy results. 
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have disregarded arguably outdated taxi licensing laws, and have been met 
with considerable business success.74 
On a more old-fashioned note, it is technically feasible for a company 
to send collectors dressed as Zorro to harass debtors in arrears, and it is 
socially acceptable to do so in some communities—including Spain.75 But 
it is decidedly not legal (any more76) in the United States,77 even if it might 
be technically possible and even, perhaps, socially acceptable. 
In fact, this category may include many of the contentious areas of 
consumer finance in recent years.78 The ways in which interest payments 
are calculated, credit-insurance products are sold, disclosures are crafted, 
and various penalties and costs are applied, are sufficiently complex that 
the public may struggle to understand them, much less be outraged by 
them, even if they are unlawful.79  
In other words, some practices engaged in by lenders in consumer 
financial transactions may be illegal but fail to attract public outrage be-
cause they are too difficult to understand or explain.80 This category seems 
to be a particularly important and intractable one from a regulatory per-
spective because it is where legal constraints operate on their own, unaided 
by other forms of constraint. Thus, this category deserves particular policy 
attention; tools and institutions designed to regulate complex areas such as 
  
 74. On the business model of these companies, which has been characterized as “regulatory 
entrepreneurship.” See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (2017). Broad and unnecessary occupational licensing laws also furnish good 
examples. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093, 1102 (2013). 
 75. Aggressive and flamboyant debt collection practices—such as harassing debtors at their 
homes and businesses while dressed as Zorro, a monk, or a clown—are permitted in Spain but not 
England, because, according to one would-be debt collector, the English “are a bunch of wimps.” See 
Jon Sindreu, Spain Has a Debt Problem and So Now It Has a Zorro Problem, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 
2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/spain-has-a-debt-problem-and-so-now-it-has-a-
zorro-problem-1501172207. No doubt the collector would feel similarly about Americans.  
 76. While I know of no evidence of this particular practice having been pursued by collectors 
on these shores, it bears noting that more aggressive practices were long condoned here. See, e.g., 
FLEMING, supra note 36 (“Known as ‘bawler-outs,’ female debt collectors tracked down the delinquent 
borrower at home or work and loudly criticized him for his failure to pay back the money borrowed.”). 
 77. The activities described would likely violate numerous provisions of U.S. law, including 
numerous sections of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2018), not to mention 
relevant state laws. 
 78. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 18, at 149 (describing complex, “abusive” fees added, 
sometimes illegally, to some “high-cost” mortgages). 
 79. Professor Willis has described, for instance, the panoply of sophisticated ways in which 
financial institutions responded to regulation mandating that banks force consumers to opt-in to (rather 
than opt-out of) fee-based overdraft protection, largely complying with the letter but undermining the 
policy goals of the law. Willis, supra note 27, at 1183–1200; see also BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 66 
(noting complexity and number of credit card fees). Professor Bar-Gill also notes that contract terms 
(such as dispute resolution limits) can be put into contracts even by sellers with “high-quality products 
and reliable customer service.” BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 28. 
 80. Similarly, there is some evidence that consumers simply misunderstand some merchant 
practices or legal protections, particularly with respect to privacy. See Willis, supra note 54, at 73 
(“Most consumers falsely believe that the law significantly restricts collection of consumer infor-
mation and that the existence of a ‘Privacy Policy’ means their information is not shared with third 
parties.” (citations omitted)). 
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consumer finance must be tailored to the social and technical context of 
such transactions, or they risk ineffectiveness. 
Area 7: Actions that are technically feasible but are neither socially 
 acceptable nor legal.  
A variety of actions might fall into this category—including most 
misuses of the powerful information technologies that are in the hands of 
businesses engaging with consumers online. One obvious example, al-
ready mentioned above, is Wells Fargo’s opening of accounts in custom-
ers’ names without consent and imposing unwanted and unneeded charges 
on auto loan customers.81 Such actions were obviously technically possi-
ble, but they ran afoul of the law as well as of social norms. Virtually any 
other technological capacity could be similarly abused, and the actor in 
question might face both legal and social sanctions.82  
Area 8: Actions that are legal, socially acceptable, and technically 
 feasible.  
This final category is the intersection of the three categories of feasi-
ble actions—actions that are not effectively constrained by any of the three 
types of constraint. It is the category of permitted actions (PA). It is the 
area within which most of the behavior actually engaged in by consumers 
and merchants falls. This area includes acts that are legally prohibited but 
are not subject to effective enforcement; or acts that are unsavory and so-
cially unacceptable but so difficult to detect that market participants are 
undeterred from engaging in them. 
Importantly, an act that falls in this category is not necessarily benign. 
Old-fashioned practices such as charging very high interest rates and im-
posing high penalties remain common, yet many consumer advocates 
would prefer that not to be the case. Technology has enabled all sorts of 
newfangled practices, such as merchants’ using Big Data to monitor con-
sumers’ moods and target them with sales pitches when they are least 
likely to be cautious or frugal.83 Such practices, when they become known, 
may eventually be thought violative of social norms; but they are not now 
(or they are engaged in covertly and, thus, cannot draw sufficient oppro-
brium). Assessing whether these various behaviors should be condemned 
socially or legally is beyond the scope of this model.  
The examples above illustrate each of the eight areas contained in this 
model. There might be disagreements over the areas in which some of 
  
 81. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Review Finds 1.4 Million More Suspect Accounts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-
accounts.html?_r=0. 
 82. Other behaviors do not, but at some point, could, fall in this category if laws were better 
enforced (legally constraining them), or if public awareness were higher (socially constraining them). 
 83. Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1320 1322–
23 (2015) (“With big data and the presence of computers, cell phones, and other devices intermediating 
consumer transactions, firms can tailor marketing, products, and prices to a single consumer in real 
time.”). 
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these examples should be located. As will be discussed in more detail be-
low, social acceptability is not an either/or proposition, and legal and tech-
nical feasibility are also subject to debate in some cases. But at a minimum, 
and notwithstanding some play at the joints, the examples demonstrate that 
a wide variety of different types of acts, and varying combinations of con-
straints, exert force on those acts. All can be mapped on this model.  
It can be readily seen how, as you consider the appropriate policy 
response to a particular act, the response will be guided, in part, by where 
you locate that act in this model. In some cases, social or technical steps 
might be sufficient to raise the “price” on a particular act. In other cases, 
for instance where a socially disfavored or technically less capable group 
is likely to be targeted, legal intervention will more likely be necessary. 
Parts III and IV of this Article explore some of these issues. First, how-
ever, the next Section explores the justifications for, and premises of, the 
model. 
D. Why a Model of “Consumer Protection”? 
This model provides a basic description of the consumer protection 
ecosystem and is intended as a starting point—a way of better structuring 
discussion over appropriate policy strategies and outcomes. It focuses on 
permitted actions in consumer transactions, taking a functional and applied 
approach to the constraints on the behavior of participants in such transac-
tions. Later, Part III of this Article will explore ramifications of this model, 
and Part IV will address potential objections to it and discuss ways it can 
be refined and expanded upon in future work. The remainder of this Part 
provides some necessary background on the premises for the model and 
the reasons it is needed.  
Taking a step back, then: Why are consumer commercial relation-
ships different? Why do we need a separate model for them? Consumer 
transactions present complicated policy problems for several reasons. 
Outside of the consumer arena, standards of business and commercial 
affairs are largely founded on expectations of repeat-dealing and reciproc-
ity.84 The law generally relies upon the assumption of sophistication, per-
mits liberal freedom of contract, and applies doctrines such as caveat emp-
tor to such transactions.  
By contrast, businesses that engage in consumer transactions—
which, for convenience, this Article simply refers to as “merchants”—are 
  
 84. The locus classicus on the relational underpinnings of standard business-to-business trans-
actions is described in Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963). For a survey of subsequent literature, see Macauley & Mertz, 
supra note 14. 
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on a different footing with respect to consumers.85 Merchants deal with 
consumers who have a wide variety of tools, expectations, and capabili-
ties. In addition, often the merchant will be the only repeat player in a 
commercial transaction; consumers often deal with a particular merchant 
or purchase that merchant’s product on a one-off basis, or, at most, a spo-
radic basis. For example, individuals buy houses or cars, or take out stu-
dent loans, only a few times in their lives, at most; whereas sellers and 
lenders engage in such transactions many times a day. For this reason, 
merchants attain greater sophistication concerning the legal and financial 
nuances of a given commercial transaction.  
In addition, most consumer injuries are too small to warrant seeking 
legal redress. For example, imagine consumers mistreated by a merchant 
in transactions involving no more than a few hundred dollars each. Even 
if the consumers were to be commercially sophisticated enough to know 
they have been injured and to know that the injury is legally remediable, 
the damages suffered by those consumers likely would be inadequate to 
justify taking any legal action on an individual basis. Absent laws provid-
ing for special remedies or procedural devices to facilitate legal actions, 
repeat-playing merchants may be underdeterred from violating the rights 
of such consumers.86 This is the type of situation that has led to calls to 
make special legal tools available to consumers, such as class actions, at-
torney’s fees provisions, statutory damages, and so on.87 
The consumer commercial ecosystem presents unique risks for mer-
chants, as well. Merchants’ reputations are frequently at stake in consumer 
transactions. They can suffer severe damage as a result of just one well-
publicized dissatisfaction with their products or service.88 Moreover, as 
the liability regime applied to merchants dealing with consumers reflects, 
the expectations for product safety are different in the consumer arena than 
in the realm of standard business relationships, where damages models are 
more predictable and risk can be more successfully distributed among both 
sellers and buyers. Finally, the special substantive and procedural protec-
tions for consumers mentioned above, such as class actions, fee-shifting, 
and statutory damages, also raise the risks for merchants.  
Finally, the consumer ecosystem also presents an unusual political 
economy. Consumer-protective laws are likely to have a sharp impact on 
  
 85. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitra-
tion Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 159–62 (2007) (discussing relevant differences in “con-
tracting culture[]” in consumer context); Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the 
Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 282–83, 285–87 (2012) [hereinafter Schmitz, Access to 
Consumer] (contrasting “B2C,” or business-to-consumer practices with “B2B,” or business-to-busi-
ness, practices).  
 86. This fact is discussed at length, and supported empirically, in Schmitz, Access to Consumer, 
supra note 85, at 283–84; see also Schmitz, supra note 20, at 214. 
 87. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 81 n.72. 
 88. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 46, at 569–70 (citing examples of individual customer com-
plains reaching an audience of many millions, and discussing instances where social pressures altered 
policies at major companies). 
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the bottom line of particular merchants or industries, and, thus, may spur 
organized and focused opposition; whereas the benefits to consumers may 
be substantial but diffuse. On the other hand, some laws may seem desir-
able to the general public but have widespread social costs that outweigh 
their benefits. 
These unique features of the consumer protection ecosystem have 
significant ramifications for law and for policy. This model is a way of 
approaching these problems more comprehensively. Importantly, it em-
phasizes that all of these unusual features involve not just legal but also 
social and technological factors. 
Virtually all concede that it is necessary to protect consumers from 
some types of dealings and find ways of providing some legal remedy even 
when individual private litigation is unlikely to deter bad action.89 But 
there is little agreement on the scope or nature of that regulation. Some 
advocates would retain only minimal regulation of egregious, often fraud-
ulent, activity. They argue that any gains to consumers from more regula-
tion would be outweighed by slowed economic growth resulting from in-
hibited behavior. In this view, regulation intended to protect consumers 
often drives them away from transactions that would improve their and 
society’s welfare.90 By contrast, advocates for more consumer protec-
tion—largely, for the last couple of decades, under the influence of behav-
ioral economics—emphasize ways in which classical rational-actor eco-
nomics fails to describe actual consumer behavior.91 These voices have 
dominated the legal academic literature on consumer issues. A large body 
of scholarship has advanced arguments concerning the inadequacy of tra-
ditional common law protections and remedies, particularly those sound-
ing in contract, for consumer commerce.92 This Article doesn’t resolve this 
  
 89. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Lia-
bility: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (arguing that consumer pro-
tection statutes overdeter, but acknowledging the need for some enhanced protections for consumer 
transactions). 
 90. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime 
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (2008) (discussing the benefits of deregulation of housing mar-
ket). 
 91. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 24–25 (applying behavior insights concerning limi-
tations of rational-actor theory to the context of consumer commercial transactions); DONALD C. 
LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS 
OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 10–13 (2016) (summarizing behavioral economics principles that have 
been applied to financial regulation). Consumer advocates have traditionally been skeptical of cost-
benefit analysis, although some proposals have been made to incorporate it more explicitly, in a way 
that is tailored to the distinct context of consumer protection. See Jeff Sovern, Can Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis Help Consumer Protection Laws? Or at Least Benefit Analysis?, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1241, 
1242 (2014) (cautiously endorsing a modified cost-benefit analysis of proposed consumer-protective 
regulations); id. at 1242–43 (explaining general reluctance of consumer advocates to endorse cost-
benefit analysis).  
 92. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in Commer-
cial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 550–52 (1997); Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code 
Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2b And 9 Be Fair To Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 124–27 
(1997).  
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debate but tries to establish a common framework for debate of particular 
policy questions. 
The very term consumer protection plays a problematic role in policy 
debates. Plainly, “consumer law” is too narrow a term for the subject of 
this model, which goes beyond mere legal constraint. “Consumer protec-
tion” is an improvement in some ways because it signals a concern for the 
social, economic, and technological context of commercial relationships. 
But it too has a weakness: it is provocative and loaded.93 “Consumer pro-
tection” might seem to locate agency solely in merchants. It might seem 
paternalistic to cast all consumers as vulnerable parties in need of protec-
tion. In addition, the term focuses solely on the aspect of regulation in-
tended to protect consumers, but regulations may have other salient or 
even primary goals—for instance, distributive concerns as between differ-
ent groups of consumers.  
But “consumer protection” remains the dominant term used in public 
policy discourse, and it is useful in certain respects because the primary 
thrust of this field is to consider ways in which consumers are different 
from other commercial actors—usually because they need more protec-
tion. My preference is to discuss only “the ecosystem of consumer com-
mercial relationships,” because this captures, with a more neutral tone, the 
scope of the key policy questions. But the phrase hardly rolls off the 
tongue, and there are no other ready substitutes. So, for the time being, I 
have recourse to the term consumer protection because it still appears to 
be the best available, serviceable—if flawed—term for indicating the gen-
eral subject matter of this model and of this Article. 
Having explained the premises and basic justification for the model 
in this Part, the next Part of this Article turns to the ramifications of the 
model for policymaking, focusing on the interrelated issues of how con-
straints relate to one another, and how they change over time. 
II. RAMIFICATIONS 
A. Interdependence of Constraints 
By this point in the Article, its single most important ramification 
should be clear: consumer law cannot be considered without a thorough 
awareness of the other constraints that effectively govern consumer com-
mercial relationships. This model reveals the interdependence of legal and 
other forms of constraint on consumer commercial interactions.  
  
 93. Professor—now Representative—Porter notes that she avoids this term because the subject 
is important to others than traditionally conceived “consumer advocates.” For instance, many law stu-
dents take consumer law courses because they anticipate working for corporate compliance depart-
ments. See generally KATHERINE M. PORTER, MODERN CONSUMER LAW (2016). As noted already, 
the model in this Article is intended to be applicable broadly and not simply as a device in favor of 
traditional “consumer protection” notions. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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In light of this interdependence, the question is which constraints 
should be preferred to accomplish a particular policy goal. Advocates and 
policymakers should consider nonlegal interventions as important levers 
of policy.94 It makes sense to look beyond legal means of constraining un-
desirable actions on consumer commerce—or expanding the possibilities 
for desirable ones.95 This Article takes as a given that some constraints are 
desirable to accomplish policy goals in the consumer context. But this 
model applies regardless of whether one prefers a minimalist policy ap-
proach or a more interventionist one.  
The benefits and drawbacks of different policy levers may depend on 
the type of challenge presented. For instance, saddling merchants with dis-
closure requirements,96 and making them face the risk of reputational dam-
age as a result of what is disclosed, may sometimes suffice to accomplish 
a policy goal.97 Sometimes, outright prohibition of a given practice may 
be justified.98 At other points, prohibition would be overkill, and policy-
makers may choose to rely on public advocacy or technological tools to 
accomplish a particular goal.99 
Importantly, this model suggests that consumer policy goals could be 
promoted by the development and promotion of technological tools.100 In 
addition to examples already mentioned, such as pop-up blockers and ad-
vocacy efforts on social media,101 advocates have floated numerous other 
ideas, including retro “technologies” such as postal banking102 and better 
consumer-oriented dispute resolution tools,103 as well as cutting edge tech-
nologies such as artificially intelligent “customer software agents.”104 An-
other example is encrypted browsers such as Tor, which are powerful tools 
  
 94. On “policy levers,” see, e.g., Surden, supra note 15, at 200–01. 
 95. As noted below, this is particularly true in times of rapid technological change, when the 
pace of legal change may lag far behind behavior on the ground. 
 96. For instance, disclosures concerning a lender’s customer base or operations could be help-
ful: What is the average indebtedness (or ratio of average indebtedness to income) of a lender’s cus-
tomers? What is the average default rate? How many first loans are ultimately rolled over into second 
loans without the balance being reduced?  
 97. See, e.g., Abby Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New Governance and Lex Infor-
matica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 129–31 (2016) (discussing “auditing and enforcing perfor-
mance standards,” and the promises and perils of reputation-based regulatory efforts). Note that this 
is a different sort of disclosure from that traditionally required by consumer laws, which focuses on 
disclosures to consumers, and has been widely criticized, although it is still thought to serve an im-
portant role. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and 
the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 712 (2006). 
 98. For instance, scholars have identified certain mortgage lending practices that they believe 
are “unsuitable per se.” Engel & McCoy, supra note 27, at 1344–45. 
 99. See id. (identifying practices that are “problematic” but not “unsuitable per se”). 
 100. I have elsewhere discussed the purposes and possibilities for these tools under the term 
“public interest innovation.” See Bradley, supra note 3, at 89–92. 
 101. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 102. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS (2015). 
 103. See, e.g., Amy Schmitz & Colin Rule, The New Handshake: Where We Are Now, 2 INT’L 
J. ONLINE DISPUTE RES. 84, 97–98 (2016). 
 104. See BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 4–5 (suggesting making cell phone use data available to 
consumers to aid in selecting optimal service plans); Fairfield, supra note 50; Rory Van Loo, Rise of 
the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1323 (2017) (advocating similar tools). 
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to prevent not only government but also business surveillance of Internet 
users.105  
The development of pro-consumer tools may initiate an arms race, 
because merchants may respond in kind. For instance, to prevent consum-
ers’ ability to price compare, merchants have labeled essentially identical 
items differently.106 But the effort to develop tools may be worthwhile de-
spite the risk of such responses. Crowd-funded “start-ups” might effec-
tively develop useful technologies, creating potential solutions for prob-
lems that other constraints have been ineffective at solving.107 Or tools 
could be developed by public institutions such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission108 and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, whose database 
of consumer complaints has proven to be a useful technological tool for 
promoting consumer protection—and spurring legal action.109 Tools could 
be produced by for-profit, charitable, or educational entities interested in 
consumer issues.110 Even mainstream, reputationally sensitive industry 
players might seek to “protect” the market from “predatory” actors, while 
also protecting their own market share along the way. 
Scholars have also proposed hybrid forms of technologically driven 
regulation that would deploy sophisticated information-gathering tools to 
yield more precise governance of consumer transactions. For instance, one 
ambitious but promising proposal is to require firms engaging in complex 
consumer transactions to draft disclosures that ensure actual consumer un-
  
 105. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 175 (2013) (“In addition to a regulatory 
shift . . . we envision technical innovation to help protect privacy in certain instances.”). They propose 
regulatory requirements involving disclosure of data sources and algorithms. 
 106. PETERSON, supra note 18, at 242–43 (“Despite the revolution in information technology 
over the past twenty years, comparatively vulnerable high-cost debtors have not improved their ability 
to price-shop, [or] organize preferences . . .”); Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1345. 
 107. Professor Fairfield argues: “Companies have little incentive to build tools for consumers 
that would prevent companies themselves from accessing potentially valuable data. That task needs to 
be handled by hackers, coding groups, consumer advocate groups, and private companies that want to 
move into building a market for pro-consumer technologies.” JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: 
PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM 224 (2017); see also O'NEIL, supra note 38, 
at 118 (“[M]athematical models can sift through data to locate people who are likely to face great 
challenges, whether from crime, poverty, or education. It’s up to society whether to use that intelli-
gence to reject and punish them—or to reach out to them with the resources they need. We can use the 
scale and efficiency that make WMDs [‘Weapons of Math Destruction,’ i.e., the tools of Big Data] so 
pernicious in order to help people. It all depends on the objective we choose.”). 
 108. E.g., Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1385–86 (proposing the FTC develop a program to gather 
data and implement a supervision program of retailers’ practices). 
 109. Several rich scholarly works have explored the database. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Calling 
on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177 
(2017); Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 895, 895 (2015); 
Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint Mechanism, 7 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 57 (2012). 
 110. Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 168, 173 (2002) (mentioning some such tools); see also O’NEIL, supra note 38, at 144 
(describing efforts at Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, and MIT to study crowdsourcing campaigns and 
biases in hiring).  
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derstanding of the proposed terms—and submit to spot-testing to demon-
strate compliance.111 All such innovations are worth considering alongside 
traditional law and regulation, and this Article’s model supports that sort 
of regulatory experimentation. 
Some efforts might seek to affect both technological constraints and 
social ones. One approach for consumer advocates would be to look to 
technologies that promote collective action and broad participation in pol-
icymaking, such as social media networks—to help consumers help them-
selves.112 Advocacy to form or change public opinion is a tried-and-true 
strategy and, in this particular arena, has long taken the shape of trying to 
deter behavior by “naming and shaming” market participants for acts that 
are not socially acceptable.113 Social media platforms have given consum-
ers a new tool for raising concerns with companies—and coordinating 
with one another to do so.114 These tools facilitate collection of data, de-
velopment of ideas, and coordination of efforts.115 They can provide means 
of political organizing and permit highly motivated individuals, who might 
otherwise have been too remote, to link together and form policy coali-
tions.116  
The capacity of technology to lower the costs of consumer coordina-
tion speaks directly to a key rationale for consumer protection: the com-
parative weakness of individual consumers engaging in one-off transac-
tions with repeat-playing merchants. This is an area in which consumer-
favoring technology, whether produced by for-profit firms or in a public 
interest context, holds considerable promise, potentially increasing the 
power of technical and social constraints on merchants.117 Again, the in-
terdependence of the different constraints in this model is clear because 
improved advocacy networks could affect both legal and social con-
straints. 
  
 111. See Willis, supra note 83, at 1315 (“Performance-based consumer law together with ongo-
ing field-testing has the potential to incentivize firms to educate rather than obfuscate, to develop 
simple and intuitive product designs that align with, rather than defy, consumer expectations, and to 
channel consumers toward products that are suitable for consumers’ circumstances.”). 
 112. See Arbel, supra note 19 (suggesting mechanisms for improving reputational constraints on 
businesses in consumer interactions). 
 113. There are many well-known examples, including RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: 
THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 18–23 (1965) (describing car manufac-
turers’ neglect of, and disdain for, effective safety measures in cars); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 
12 (1906) (describing conditions and practices of meat-packing industry and leading to broad industry 
reforms both voluntary and legally imposed). 
 114. Jonathan Wolfe, Want Faster Airline Customer Service? Try Tweeting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/travel/airline-customer-service-twitter.html.  
 115. Vindu Goel, G.M. Uses Social Media to Manage Customers and Its Reputation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/business/after-huge-recall-gm-speaks-to-cus-
tomers-through-social-media.html. 
 116. See, e.g., Clive Thompson, Social Networks Must Face Up to Their Political Impact, WIRED 
(Jan. 5, 2017, 6:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/social-networks-must-face-political-im-
pact/. 
 117. See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text.  
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B. Constraints Over Time 
The three broad types of constraint that form the basis of this model 
are interconnected in a second way: a change in any one of them will affect 
the others. This model reveals the importance of evaluating changes in the 
various constraints as technology develops, laws are enacted or repealed, 
and social attitudes change.  
Often, a change in one constraint will expand or contract the set of 
permitted actions, which may encourage the easing or tightening of other 
constraints. One example would include a merchant who gains some 
tricky, new technological advantage, which over time, after being filtered 
through public deliberation and the legislative process, is then condemned 
or constricted through social norms or legal regulation. Other examples 
might be how social networking has changed social norms on privacy and 
how electronic signatures and mobile banking have changed views on tra-
ditional transactional formalities.118 The influence can also run the other 
direction: technology takes cues from society and culture; technology 
businesses focus tremendous energy on trying to give consumers what 
they want.119 Similarly, views on the social acceptability of particular con-
duct can lead to legal change120—or alternatively, views themselves can 
be shaped by what has been deemed unlawful.121  
The point is that the system is highly dynamic and multilayered, and 
any change may set off a complex, iterative process in which various fac-
tors react to one another. This interdependence is a crucial aspect of policy 
change in this arena. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this.  
  
 118. See Schmitz, supra note 20, at 247; Smith & Anderson, supra note 20.  
 119. Although Steve Jobs famously claimed that “customers don’t know what they want until 
we’ve shown them,” this is of course not the usual method for product development in successful 
technology businesses. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 143 (2011). 
 120. There is a vast literature on how, and for whose benefit, such change happens. See, e.g., 
Anne N. Costain & Steven Majstorovic, Congress, Social Movements and Public Opinion: Multiple 
Origins of Women's Rights Legislation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 111, 111 (1994).  
 121. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 75 (reflecting on whether the law influenced social 
norms regarding responsibilities for fence-building expenses among neighboring landowners in Shasta 
County, or whether the norms shaped the legal regime); id. at 284 (noting that “legal policies them-
selves influence the vitality of informal systems of social control [i.e., norms]”).  
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Figure 4. 
Figures 1–3 took place at one moment in time (t1), and the scope of 
permitted actions was the Area 8. Figure 4 advances to a later moment in 
time, t2, when more actions have become feasible due to technological 
advancements. Note that all of the areas in the previous figures have been 
altered by the change in technology. Most importantly, the scope of per-
mitted actions is larger, as indicated by the addition of Area 9 to Area 8. 
PAt2 = 8 + 9.  
Note that the scope of the law has not changed. Nonetheless, the ter-
rain of legally permitted actions, and permitted actions generally, is sig-
nificantly larger. In other words, there has been an expansion of the actions 
that market participants are effectively permitted to take. Stated differ-
ently, the scope of consumer protection has been eroded by the amount of 
this expansion.122  
The changes represented in Figure 4 are not normatively good or bad 
on their face. But they are relevant for consumer policy going forward after 
time t2. A change might be used, for example, to supply a regulatory ra-
tionale—to argue that policies should be updated to deal with concerns 
raised by newly feasible practices. Alternatively, the change could support 
an argument that a regulation is no longer necessary because of a cheaper 
or more tailored technical “fix” now available. Perhaps technological 
tools, such as those now referred to under the umbrella term Big Data, 
could be deployed to anticipate social or technological developments that 
will render existing regulation obsolete or counterproductive. Such tools 
would permit predictive regulation or deregulation, thus eliminating some 
  
 122. My use of “erosion” in this context is indebted to Professor Harry Surden. In his important 
work developing similar principles (largely focused on intellectual property), Professor Surden artic-
ulates the effects of such changes: “[T]he Technological Cost of activities can change over time. 
Emerging technologies frequently eliminate the capacity-limiting constraints common in the previous 
technological era. When legal frameworks depend upon activities being Technologically Costly, they 
are susceptible to shifts in strength, scope, or effectiveness when the Technological Cost of activities 
decreases.” See Surden, supra note 15, at 138–39; id. at 142 (referring to this process as a technological 
erosion of legal rights). 
2019] THE COMSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM 69 
of the “lag” that bedevils regulation in quickly developing policy areas. 
This is the hope of some who have begun to advocate for “smarter,” more 
technologically adept regulatory strategies.123 
Importantly, this model underscores that many nominally “legal” 
practices aren’t feasible at any given time. And, if they aren’t feasible, they 
almost certainly aren’t considered by prior policymakers. Accordingly, 
there is a sound rationale for new attention (whether regulatory or dereg-
ulatory in normative direction) to be focused on the newly emerging tech-
nical possibilities. This is a crucial insight yielded by the model—alt-
hough, as already stated, this model does not directly address the policy 
steps that should be taken. 
In Figure 5, we can consider the effect of a change in the law, at a 
third time: t3. Here, Area 10 is the new scope of permitted actions: PAt3 
= 10. Area 11 indicates what used to be permitted at t2 but is now unlaw-
ful—it has been removed from the scope of previously permitted actions.  
 
Figure 5. 
The law has changed from time t2 to t3; there has been a constriction 
of the scope of permitted actions. Because of technological advancement, 
previously infeasible conduct may become easier and, thus, more com-
mon. In response—assuming that the goal is to preserve the pre-existing 
baseline or the regulatory balance124—legal tools may be deployed, as de-
picted in Figure 5. One of the other areas could also be contracted: social 
  
 123. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 124. As with other areas of regulatory law or policy (for instance, environmental law or privacy 
law), there is presumably a socially desirable amount of regulation at any given time, although what 
amount that is, and what factors should be weighed to determine it, are contestable. A situation that 
yields either more or less regulation than that optimum amount is socially undesirable. There is of 
course no reason to believe that at a particular time we enjoy the optimum amount of regulation in any 
area, although it might seem reasonable to take the current level as a baseline against which to examine 
future effects—leaving to the side whether those effects either bring the existing regime closer to 
alignment with an optimum regulatory arrangement or further take it out of alignment, which will be 
determined by normative views concerning the baseline state of affairs and not dictated by this model. 
70 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1 
norms could constrain the newly possible conduct, or technological tools 
could be developed by public authorities or by advocates to narrow the 
scope of permitted actions.  
Thus, while there may be many differences in the way legal and tech-
nical constraints are thought about or acted upon, they work in tandem and 
may be substitutable for one another in the context of the effective scope 
of consumer protection at any given time.125 And consumer commercial 
relationships will be particularly dynamic when any of the categories of 
constraints are rapidly changing. Therefore, policy analyses will have to 
be equally dynamic.  
The two ramifications that have been surveyed in this Part of the Ar-
ticle suggest that the scope of consumer policy and the stability of the reg-
ulatory framework depend on the social and technological context, which 
may be highly dynamic, requiring frequent adjustments at times of social 
and technological change. The area of permitted action at the center of the 
Venn diagram will quickly change as new types of socially and technically 
feasible activities emerge. Reacting to such changes poses particular chal-
lenges and should encourage policymakers to consider, for instance, what 
types of institutions and policy approaches are best, not just in the current 
context but in anticipation of future changes. This is the subject of the next 
Section, which focuses on the ramifications of rapid technological change 
as conceived in this Article’s consumer protection model. 
C. Implications of Technological Change for Consumer Policy 
Technological change deserves particular consideration. As this 
model reveals in Figure 4 above, protective regulation takes place against 
the factual background existing at a given time. Progress in technology 
makes existing regulation outdated or ill-fitting in various ways with re-
spect to each new reality that technology presents to market participants. 
Consumer commerce has been, and continues to be, shaped by dramatic 
new technology developments as a result of the rise of mobile computing 
and Big Data.126 Technological changes tend to initiate an iterative and 
unstable process that requires multiple interventions simply to maintain a 
semblance of the pre-existing baseline of regulation—to preserve what 
could be conceived of as the “regulatory balance” between the different 
interests implicated in consumer transactions.  
To be clear, the model also emphasizes that interventions need not be 
legal in nature—we need not trust in law alone. Policy interventions could 
  
 125. On the relevant work of Professors Lessig, Ellickson, and Surden, whose ideas have greatly 
influenced this project. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 126. As some technologists have put it, only somewhat hyperbolically: “We are in the midst of 
a great infrastructure project that in some ways rivals those of the past, from Roman aquaducts to the 
Enlightenment’s Encyclopedie. We fail to appreciate this because today's project is so new, because 
we are in the middle of it, and because . . . the product of our labors is intangible. The project is data-
fication. Like those other infrastructural advances, it will bring about fundamental changes to society.” 
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 105, at 96. 
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include countervailing technological developments or changes in social 
norms. These practical constraints can have the effect of shifting the pro-
tective frontier in one direction or another, or of moving in the direction 
of restoring the balance of interests. None of this points to any particular 
answer to the important normative question of whether this “balance” is 
appropriate in the first place—in other words, whether there is too much 
or too little consumer protection in the baseline state. But this model pro-
vides a sound structure for approaching that question from a better-con-
textualized starting point.  
Technological changes can unsettle an existing legal regime when 
they enable a party to take actions that were previously unavailable or that 
have become much easier. Such technological changes may shift a regula-
tory balance in one direction or the other, potentially undermining what-
ever policy rationale justified that regulatory status quo in the first place. 
To take a prominent example from constitutional law, consider the devel-
opment of infrared search technology that permits police to “search” a 
house from outside on the street. When the Supreme Court grappled with 
this issue in Kyllo v. United States,127 it had to determine whether its old 
legal rule, which was that searches undertaken in a public place (the street) 
were presumptively permitted, still applied when the search tool (infrared 
camera) was much more invasive than previous technology. The tool had 
the effect of shifting the balance in the favor of the searchers over the 
searched. The legal rule had to shift to restrike the balance. In Kyllo, be-
cause the legal test involves reasonable expectations of privacy, social 
norms were involved as well.128 
In consumer law, technological developments around privacy and 
personal data furnish a similar example. Consumer data can be put to uses 
inconceivable when it was gathered, and users of the data explore new uses 
every day. Models of protection of privacy that rely on consent cannot 
make sense of such a world. Depending on how strictly consent is inter-
preted, productive and benign uses may be ruled out, or consumers may 
suffer the consequences of aggressive, unanticipated uses of their personal 
information.129  
Interventions may be required more often under some conditions than 
others—namely, (1) if technology is evolving quickly and (2) if it is doing 
so in such a way as to significantly shift a regulatory balance. Both stated 
conditions are necessary: if technological change is slow, then new inter-
ventions may correspondingly be required only rarely; if technological 
change isn’t likely to shift a regulatory balance, but, instead, is merely 
lowering transaction costs for all, then there is no need for intervention. It 
  
 127. 533 U.S. 27, 28–29 (2001). 
 128. Id. at 33–34. 
 129. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 105, at 173 (noting inadequacy of con-
sent-based models “[i]n the era of big data . . . when much of data's value is in secondary uses that 
may have been unimagined when the data was collected”). 
72 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1 
may be the case that when technological change proceeds slowly, it is eas-
ier for society to identify its effects and craft policy to deal with them. In 
contrast, more rapid changes may outstrip society’s capacity for delibera-
tion.130 In addition, regulatory capture may mean that it is difficult or im-
possible to regulate due to the dispersed benefit of additional regulation 
and the concentrated benefit (by the industry) of failure to regulate.131 
There is substantial academic literature occupied with the fact that 
technological change often outpaces that of legal change.132 One lesson 
from that body of research, which is consistent with this Article’s model, 
is that the appropriate type of legal intervention should be influenced by 
the anticipated pace of change as well as the expertise required to identify 
and consider legal response to those changes. For instance, expert institu-
tions empowered to enforce flexible, standards-based laws and regulations 
may be preferable when rapid adjustments are expected.133 On the other 
hand, where the market environment is relatively stable, the greater cer-
tainty and enforceability of bright-line rules may be preferable.  
In the consumer protection context, the iterative process of techno-
logical change and intervention has important implications for how con-
sumer protection laws should be crafted as well as for how institutions 
should be established or empowered to monitor and enforce legal compli-
ance in the face of technological change. There are other relevant factors 
to be weighed, such as the degree of political accountability and the level 
of government most appropriate for a given legal response.  
The rigidity of some forms of legal response may be undesirable be-
cause technology can have complex policy effects (for instance, having 
alternately consumer- or merchant-favoring aspects), and because new 
technologies typically build in unanticipated ways on prior innovations. 
  
 130. The process by which social norms are developed requires at a minimum sufficient time to 
pass, and public attention to be directed to the issue, such that society can become aware of the issue 
and then come to views about its acceptability. See generally O’NEIL, supra note 38, at 144–60 (dis-
cussing and collecting sources on the process by which social views make their way into law). 
 131. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 257 (“Government rulemaking is particularly 
unlikely to be welfare enhancing . . . in the many spheres of activity in which well-placed rent seekers 
can obtain legislation that aids them at the greater expense of the politically weak.”); MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–3 (1965) (de-
scribing, inter alia, the greater responsiveness of legislative actors to focused interests over the broader 
public that faces only diffuse harms or benefits from any particular legislative intervention). 
 132. This fact is especially evident in the burgeoning body of scholarship trying to bring techno-
logical innovation into the regulatory space. See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech and 
the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 371 (2017); Chris 
Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1035–39 
(2015); Wulf A. Kaal and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts 
to Data, 57 Jurimetrics (forthcoming); Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the 
Compliance Era, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 404–08 (2019); Willis, supra note 83, at 1322–23 (pro-
posing the use of novel testing requirements to ensure effective disclosure of important but often over-
looked or misunderstood transactional terms); Willis, supra note 54, at 126–27 (noting that tech firms 
can rapidly try out different tacks to see what is effective but that “[p]olicymakers are not nearly so 
agile”). 
 133. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 132, at 397–98. 
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Rigid or blanket prohibitions may have the effect of obstructing or fore-
closing innovations that might prove beneficial—and might even render 
regulation unnecessary. One way of preserving oversight alongside flexi-
bility is to create “regulatory sandboxes,” zones of permitted experimen-
tation and regulatory forbearance for technology businesses in select are-
nas.134 
In addition to law being a slow-moving tool, and to it being vulnera-
ble to capture, there is also the problem that it is unlikely to be as forward-
looking as technologists themselves are. It is difficult to regulate things 
that we can barely dream up. Lawmakers are understandably reluctant to 
be too forward-looking in regulations—to regulate hypotheticals. Regulat-
ing such “bleeding-edge” technologies rarely will seem a worthwhile use 
of legislative resources or political capital. And, even if political will is 
present, it requires an accurate anticipation of what emerging technology 
will look like and how society and businesses will respond to its introduc-
tion.  
As recently as a decade and a half ago, “going viral on social media” 
was a phrase that would mean little. Thus, we could hardly have expected 
regulation regarding privacy or property rights in “viral videos,” any more 
than we could have expected regulation of the flying skateboards that Back 
to the Future Part II predicted would be commonplace by 2015 (but that 
we, unfortunately, still await).135 To take another example, a futuristic 
technology that beat flying skateboards to store shelves is that of a “starter 
interrupter” or “kill switch” device, which has dramatically changed the 
car repossession industry (and, thus, the car lending arena, particularly for 
“sub-prime” borrowers).136 Generally speaking, these are devices placed 
on vehicles by lenders who, if the owner of the vehicle defaults on loan 
payments, can activate the device to get its precise location, and disable 
the car’s engine. The technologies required to produce such a device at 
reasonable cost were only developed recently. Therefore, it is understand-
able that no particular laws were in place governing their use. Although 
the general backdrop of common law and statutory consumer law protec-
tions were in place providing some backstop against abuses, these protec-
tions may be insufficient.137 Regulators in some states have scrambled to 
investigate this technology and promulgate rules governing the way such 
devices can be used—for instance, to ensure that cars are in safe places, 
  
 134. See Bradley, supra note 50, at 85–89 (discussing regulatory sandboxes). 
 135. BACK TO THE FUTURE II (Universal Pictures 1989). The wheeled “hoverboards” that have 
become popular of late are fun to ride, but still do not approach the allure of a true flying skateboard. 
 136. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 78; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Pay-
ment? Good Luck Moving That Car, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), https://dealbook.ny-
times.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-payment-good-luck-moving-that-car/. 
 137. Juliet M. Moringiello, Electronic Issues in Secured Financing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 285, 297–303 (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016) (surveying and cri-
tiquing current commercial law implications of this type of device); Erica N. Sweeting, Comment, 
Disabling Disabling Devices: Adopting Parameters for Addressing a Predatory Auto-Lending Tech-
nique on Subprime Borrowers, 59 HOW. L.J. 817, 818–19 (2016) (arguing for stricter regulations of 
such devices). 
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that debtors are given advance warning, and so on.138 But such efforts, by 
necessity, lag the innovations themselves. Figuring out the degree to which 
legal or social constraints should fill the space left by these technological 
advances is the core of the challenge (as visually depicted in Figure 4 
above).  
Online lending is another recently ascendant consumer transacting 
technology that presents significant policy concerns. Online lenders, like 
many other participants in the consumer finance industry, have benefitted 
from technological innovations, including from what is perhaps euphemis-
tically referred to as the “lowering of compliance costs.”139 But the lower-
ing of compliance costs is not an unqualified good. It has at least two per-
tinent dimensions, both of which are in evidence in online lending. One 
function that technology can have is to lower the cost of compliance with 
existing laws and regulations. Required reports and notices can be auto-
matically generated; charges can be accurately counted and provided at a 
moment’s notice; entire swathes of “back office” functions can be auto-
mated. This lowering of transaction costs has likely yielded significant net 
benefits for society.140 By contrast, compliance costs can be saved by the 
evasion of legitimately imposed and normatively desirable protections. 
This can occur, for instance, by exploiting technology to perform an oth-
erwise prohibited act—essentially as a form of technologically enabled 
regulatory arbitrage.141 Some online lenders, particularly those unaffiliated 
with major financial institutions, seem to be profiting, at least in part, from 
these unsavory practices. This is an apt example of an area where regula-
tion understandably lagged as the industry, and the technology upon which 
it relies, developed rapidly. Regulatory energy can and should be focused 
on distinguishing between technologically driven reduction of compliance 
costs and technologically enabling evasion of compliance itself. 
As I have argued in prior work on financial technology,142 many tech-
nologies have a double edge because they provide inarguable societal ben-
efits yet also raise consumer protection concerns. In fact, many consumer 
advocates seem to believe that consumers have lost significant ground and 
  
 138. See Moringiello, supra note 137, at 297–303; Sweeting, supra note 137, at 833–34. 
 139. See Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 
803–04 (2018). 
 140. Of course, it may have problematic distributive effects, for instance on former back-office 
workers whose skills are no longer in demand. But while these distributive effects may merit a policy 
response, the overall benefits appear likely to have been substantial and a rational response would be 
unlikely to involve clawing back use of these innovations. 
 141. There is an important and still developing scholarship on this point as regards the “gig econ-
omy.” See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How 
Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 327 (2016) 
(“Notably, when these services take regulatory shortcuts, it is difficult to know whether the services 
gain traction through genuine excellence and efficiency, or through regulatory arbitrage.”); Pollman 
& Barry, supra note 74, at 384–409; id. at 397 n.61 (distinguishing between regulatory arbitrage and 
the authors’ term, “regulatory entrepreneurship”). There is also important scholarship on this issue in 
the context of online lenders. See Odinet, supra note 139. 
 142. Bradley, supra note 3, at 80–82. 
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are being taken advantage of now more than ever. Unfortunately, I’m not 
aware of any empirical work addressing this point.143  
Take, for example, price comparison tools and shopping platforms. 
These platforms allow consumers to compare potential loan terms before 
they enter a car dealership or to compare insurance quotes from numerous 
vendors.144 But the owner of the platform may also use the consumer’s 
information to gather detailed and monetizable consumer information pro-
files, to steer business in preferred directions (potentially for a finder’s 
fee), and to price discriminate based on anticipated consumer behavior—
all without the consumer’s awareness.145 This isn’t necessarily undesira-
ble; overall social welfare could be increased if lenders are able to target 
likely customers for particular financial products, or it could be diminished 
if the outcome is merely to steer unsophisticated borrowers into inferior 
products. That is a difficult, multidimensional question requiring contex-
tualized analysis of the practices in question. Either way, the novel busi-
ness practices of such platforms implicate longstanding consumer protec-
tion policy concerns and complicate the weighing of costs and benefits. 
Most of the policy tools sketched in this Article may seem to be con-
sumer-protective in the sense that they are ways of narrowing the scope of 
permitted actions under the model. This is because we can expect innova-
tions usually to expand possibilities by permitting parties to engage in be-
havior not previously possible—or behavior that would have been unlaw-
ful if done in the old way but may not be if done in the new way. The area 
of technical feasibility, in other words, seems likely to expand rather than 
contract, and, thus, to demand consistently renewed regulatory attention. 
Often, the net effect of technological change will be commerce- or mer-
chant-favoring. Merchants are well-funded repeat players with concen-
trated financial stakes in attaining outcomes favorable to their interests. 
Merchants are likely to have greater motivation, funds, and expertise, 
  
 143. Professor Van Loo argues: “[I]n the modern technological and scale-driven commercial 
landscape, the sophistication gap between buyers and sellers of goods is large and has grown consid-
erably, as it has in financial products.” Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1334; see also Schmitz & Rule, 
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 144. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 63–68 (explaining LendingTree’s basic business model and 
appeal to consumers); Van Loo, supra note 104, at 1291–93 (discussing concerns about Lending Tree 
and similar companies’ choice architecture). 
 145. See, e.g., FAIRFIELD, supra note 107, at 7 (“[C]omparison shoppers pay more for airfare 
because their browser histories indicate they are very interested in certain flights.”); Bradley, supra 
note 3, at 68-70 (noting “the implications of the widespread use of LendingTree’s technology are 
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aware of and that might harm their interests); Van Loo, supra note 104, at 1267 (expressing concern 
that digital intermediaries “subtly advance their interests at the expense of those they serve”). 
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which allow them to induce and take advantage of innovations more ef-
fectively than consumers. As in the political context, so too in the technical 
one: consumers’ diffuse interests makes them more susceptible to coordi-
nation difficulties that leave them weaker than that of concentrated mer-
chant interests.146 Accordingly, and despite these headwinds, most policy 
energy will likely have to be expended in the direction of providing greater 
protection.  
Early optimism about the information technology revolution has been 
dampened considerably by the rise of large, extremely powerful, and 
profit-focused technology companies. The rise of Big Data, which in-
cludes the technologically enabled rise of tools to track consumer Internet 
behavior and the increasingly developed trade in detailed consumer 
data,147 at least makes clear that information technology is no social or 
political panacea. Difficult social, legal, and technological questions are 
going to continue to arise—if anything, more often now than ever.  
In conclusion, there are two closely related policy implications of 
technological change that the consumer protection model brings to light. 
First, interventions (of whatever sort) may be required more often 
when technology evolves particularly quickly, as has been the case in re-
cent years.148 As this model’s multifaceted and contextualized approach 
shows, an assessment of the effects of technological change and new busi-
ness practices is more complex than it might initially appear. And, map-
ping the effects on this model is only the beginning of the debate about 
whether the developments are normatively desirable and how the devel-
opments should be dealt with as a matter of policy to provide necessary 
regulation without stifling innovation. The iterative and dynamic process 
reflected in this model should be a significant factor in selecting appropri-
ate laws for consumer protection and shaping institutions for monitoring 
and enforcing compliance.149 Some approaches may be more successful 
than others in such a quickly changing and complex environment.  
Second, because the pace of legal change may lag behind that of tech-
nological change, advocates for and against consumer protection should 
consider promoting their ends through means other than law. For example, 
they could encourage the development and promotion of technological 
tools that accomplish advocates’ desired policy ends. 
  
 146. As noted, some technical tools may partially mitigate consumers’ disadvantage in this re-
spect. See supra notes 113–117 and accompanying text. 
 147. See, e.g., FAIRFIELD, supra note 107, at 6. 
 148. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 3, at 82–92 (discussing ways to approach the regulation of 
quickly evolving financial technology businesses). 
 149. Professor Van Loo has identified and explained the importance of the rise of “regulatory 
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The next Part turns to potential objections to this model as presented 
so far, and proposes some refinements that will help as this model is ap-
plied to particular sets of circumstances. 
III. REFINEMENTS 
This Part answers several potential objections and suggests directions 
in which the model could be developed further.  
A. Varieties of Consumers, Merchants, and Commercial Relationships  
One potential critique of this model is that legal, social, and technical 
factors will constrain some market participants more or less than others. 
Consumers, merchants, and the transactional relationships they pursue are 
all different in meaningful ways, which may not be reflected in this Arti-
cle’s model. 
Compare an online lender, thinly capitalized, based overseas, and es-
tablished the month before a transaction, which may have little risk of le-
gal sanction or concern for reputational cost, with an established institu-
tion with a “brick-and-mortar” presence in its customers’ community.150 
The latter’s submission to social norms, to legal jurisdiction, and to regu-
latory compliance norms is much more likely. By contrast, ephemeral cor-
porate entities—described above as “disposable” entities—might require 
different and tighter constraints.151 Modeling the constraints on merchants 
in general might not capture important variations among the range of ac-
tors.  
The same principle applies to consumers. Modeling the degree to 
which consumers in general are “protected” may not capture important 
data concerning variations among the consumer population. Consider a 
consumer from a vulnerable class, who may be more in need of protection 
than the bulk of individuals who are able to navigate certain types of trans-
action with little to no protection.152 The need for consideration of all of 
these distinctions, which applies to any analysis of commercial relation-
ships, is especially salient in the consumer context, because many of the 
justifications for consumer law emerge directly from beliefs about the vul-
nerabilities of particular groups or the advantages (the “uneven playing 
field”) enjoyed by their commercial counterparts. A policy intervention 
may hurt some consumers despite helping others.153 Other interventions 
may be challenging to implement for a similar reason: efforts at consumer 
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 153. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 
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education or disclosure may be effective as to some but not all consumers, 
having the undesirable effect of picking winners and losers.154 
Not all transactions are the same, either. Transactions involving 
health care have moral, legal, and financial significance beyond that of a 
trip to the grocery store. A home mortgage transaction requires the coor-
dination of numerous actors, compliance with complex regulations, and 
the undertaking of a large financial obligation by the consumer. What suc-
cessfully constrains misbehavior in one type of transaction may not do so 
in another (due, for instance, to different degrees of concern over social 
pressure), or may constrain misbehavior at one price level but not another 
(due, for instance, to degrees of concern over legal compliance risk).  
No doubt, this model may yield a different set of permitted actions in 
one context than in another. It is dependent on the time, place, actors, and 
transactions under consideration. Responding to this concern, one way this 
model could be applied in particular situations is by mapping how parties 
in a particular type of commercial relationship might experience the rele-
vant constraints. In other words, the characteristics of the participants 
(merchants as well as consumers), and the types of transaction(s) they in-
tend to pursue, could be considered in applying this model to a policy 
question. Each relationship—each unique set of participants and each 
unique type and size of transaction—could be considered by reference to 
a different version of the model’s diagram. This approach simply reflects 
the reality that each consumer relationship is governed by a different con-
figuration of constraints. More tailored versions of this model could reflect 
this more nuanced aspect of reality.  
This Article avoids the weighing of justifications for consumer pro-
tection.155 Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider how different laws 
and institutions may be more justifiable or salient to different regulatory 
constituencies. For example, some consumer protections are geared to-
ward addressing distributive concerns, including laws that require bank 
customers to opt-in to “overdraft protection,” and prescribing methods for 
banks applying and processing overdraft transactions and charges.156 
Leaving aside the merits of these particular laws, they have little bearing 
on the lives of most wealthy consumers; rather, they are methods for fi-
nancial institutions to wring profit from small accounts. By contrast, the 
seemingly unobjectionable right to have a free “credit freeze” put on credit 
  
 154. Professor Willis notes that technologies might allow merchants and regulators to distinguish 
among groups. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 54, at 126–27 (“Consumers are a diverse and fickle lot; 
what one consumer finds acceptable another finds out-of-bounds, and a single consumer might find a 
path-breaking firm’s actions disquieting at first but unremarkable if the rest of the market moves in 
the same direction. However, firms can send a diverse set of marketing messages (informed by behav-
ioral tracking data) and only need one of these to work with any particular consumer.”) (footnote 
omitted)). 
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reports at the major credit reporting agencies seems likely to benefit pri-
marily the relatively sophisticated, who will understand why a freeze is a 
good idea, who will bother to do it, who have significant credit to protect, 
and who do not need to access new credit regularly because they maintain 
ample open lines. Further work may require that this Article’s model better 
address the differences between protections such as these that are focused 
on particular groups and protections whose benefits are not so concen-
trated. More refined and specific models might better describe the dynam-
ics that will be at play in specific consumer protection subareas. 
A specific concern of this nature, which may become more salient as 
technology becomes more pervasive in daily consumer transactions, is ac-
cess to technology. If it is the case that technological advancements can 
serve as consumer protection tools, then access to the relevant technology 
amounts to access to justice. For instance, tech-savvy people may be more 
protected from abuses by technological tools. If it were easy to confirm 
that a large percentage of a given group is already protected through those 
means, policymakers might not deem it worthwhile to help that group any 
further through law. The problem is an obvious one with respect to specif-
ically legal tools, such as online dispute resolution tools, which may in 
effect require access not just to a reliable Internet connection but also tools 
for document creation, scanning, or submission, requiring a significant de-
gree of technological access and skill.  
The same concern may be present less directly, but just as im-
portantly, with respect to tools for protecting privacy, or for coordinating 
consumer advocacy on social media. The capacity to deploy social media 
effectively is a modern skill. Knowledge of, and access to, the best tech-
nological tools for accomplishing a given consumer’s goals may be be-
yond the capacity of some. But because access to legal tools—lawyers, 
legal research tools, etc.—has long been available in only a limited fashion 
to many, it is far from clear that reliance on technological tools would 
make low-resourced individuals worse off on net. At the same time it re-
mains important that, merely because the areas of deprivation and inequal-
ity have shifted, reliance upon technology not lead to an erroneous con-
clusion that access to justice issues are solved. 
In addition, consumer privacy, discrimination against protected clas-
ses, and abusive contracting practices have all formed important parts of 
policy discussions in the consumer arena, yet they all have different etiol-
ogies and demand distinct responses.157 Some areas may be more suscep-
tible to legal interventions than to technologically driven ones. Other areas 
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of consumer protection may be more prone to undetected “creep” of tech-
nological advancement at the expense of legal protection.158 More refined 
versions of this model could be useful in identifying these distinctive char-
acteristics. 
In sum, this model can provide both a bird’s eye view as well as more 
tailored, fine-grained views. This capacity is a feature, not a bug. This 
model can aggregate various forms of legal protection and technological 
capability and may obscure important distinctions among different types 
of consumer protection concerns. Setting an appropriate level of detail for 
a given application of the model requires careful judgment and may pro-
voke debate.  
A final observation here is that it is not just this model, but the un-
derlying law and policy, that needs to become more refined to take into 
account differences among different actors and relationships. What this 
critique reveals is that a move toward bespoke consumer policy (and not 
just a bespoke model) needs to be considered more seriously.159 Perhaps 
laws and policies should be tailored to types of consumers, types of mer-
chants, and to the types of commercial relationships entered into.160 This 
might represent a radical shift in some ways but might also make the most 
sense of a field that currently otherwise lacks coherence. This model can 
hopefully serve as a tool to advocate for that change. 
B. Consumer Self-Defense and Learning 
A second objection is of a more libertarian bent: this model relies too 
heavily on the paternalistic underpinnings of traditional consumer protec-
tion and ignores the degree to which consumers can and will protect them-
selves if it is in their interest to do so, by learning to be suspicious of dan-
gerous actors or practices and otherwise adjusting their behavior.161 In 
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other words, this model does not include consumers’ own agency. After 
all, as the objection goes, consumers are “protected” from any activities 
that they won’t “fall for,” that they “protect themselves” from, whether by 
declining to enter into a particular transaction, or resisting certain forms or 
terms of a transaction. For example, they can decline the often-offered 
“extended warranties” and the many other upsell products that are not eco-
nomically beneficial for consumers. It might be the case that technological 
advantages only hold sway, if at all, for a particular time and then fade in 
their power over savvy consumers.  
This sort of adjustment is plausible, in many respects, as to consum-
ers who are capable of making such adjustments—those in possession of 
a sufficient degree of technological or financial literacy. That said, there 
is reason for skepticism concerning the idea that “consumer education” 
obviates the need for external constraints on merchant behavior.162 In any 
case, assuming this learning sometimes occurs on a wide scale, the objec-
tion is that a model that ignores it could induce misguided policy efforts, 
which would further hinder efficient and beneficial commercial activities 
through onerous regulation. This line of thought is worth exploration, es-
pecially by empiricists who may be able to study the degrees to which 
theories of consumer behavior underlying this critique are borne out in 
reality.  
This factor is omitted from this Article’s model because this model is 
structured to deal with external constraints on behavior rather than self-
constraints consumers might provide for themselves, and there is no obvi-
ous way to integrate these “consumer adaptation” factors. If, indeed, con-
sumers are capable of protecting themselves against a given merchant 
strategy, whether from the outset or through adjustment over time, then 
the justification for external protections of whatever sort will diminish. 
This model, in other words, is implicated when consumers as a whole or 
(more often) as a group with certain specified characteristics, are in need 
of the protection that can be provided by external sources such as regula-
tions, institutions, technologies, or simply social opprobrium. Whether the 
need exists cannot be answered by reference to this model. 
A more pointed version of the objection might be that this model is 
not as neutral as it purports to be regarding the underlying justifications 
for regulation. Perhaps the model “loads the dice” in a pro-intervention 
way by focusing on certain external constraints to the exclusion of other 
internal ones.  
But this model leaves a wide opening for nonlegal, self-help mecha-
nisms such as technological tools or public advocacy to be used as policy 
tools (as discussed in the preceding part). To extend the idea of self-help 
to the notion of a consumer simply thinking twice before engaging in a 
  
 162. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 
197 (2008); Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1349–50. 
82 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1 
transaction would move this Article from the realm of law and policy, and 
more directly to the realm of psychology. While other scholars are produc-
ing excellent work on the psychology of consumer commercial behavior, 
this Article is not intended as a contribution to that work. Insofar as these 
“interior” constraints are salient, they exist apart from and prior to any-
thing in the model. This model focuses on factors that are more readily 
observable in policy analysis. It is not intended to denigrate or minimize 
the importance of underlying preferences, beliefs, and behaviors that are 
important aspects of consumer commercial relationships. 
C. Systemic Risk, Discrimination, Innovation, and Other Policy Con-
cerns  
A final limitation is that by focusing on consumer protection, the 
model does not directly speak to other goals of consumer law and policy. 
These goals include working against prohibited forms of discrimination, 
fostering technological innovation, protecting trade secrets, and avoiding 
systemic risks to the broader economy that could be caused by consumer 
commercial relationships gone wrong. This model provides a framework 
for understanding what functionally constrains participants in transactions. 
It does not canvas all considerations relevant to normative judgments 
about particular policies or particular commercial transactions. Whether 
or not those policies are normatively desirable when the complete scope 
of their societal costs and benefits are considered is a question to which 
this model contributes but does not furnish the sole basis for answering. In 
other words, this model focuses on the constraints that regulate the com-
mercial relationships formed between consumer and merchant. Because of 
this, it omits consideration of some of the externalities, whether positive 
or negative, of those relationships.  
Subprime mortgage loans to consumers played a prominent role in 
the 2007–2009 financial crisis.163 The extent to which the primary cause 
of the financial crisis was consumer borrowing, rather than the esoteric 
financial uses to which it was put by structured finance experts at financial 
institutions, remains a matter of debate. Regardless, current regulations 
with respect to similar transactions are intended to protect the participants 
–—and to cushion the broader economy from the shock of these loans all 
going bad at once. This model does not directly reflect the additional goals 
or effects of policies. 
Similarly, this model also ignores the many technological changes 
that benefit society at large. For instance, technological advances often 
lower transaction costs in commercial relationships, benefitting all. Some 
innovations in FinTech companies have done this by facilitating payments 
in consumer transactions, permitting easier detection of fraud, and so 
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on.164 As mentioned above, some technological innovations lower costs by 
permitting companies to avoid regulatory compliance, exploiting regula-
tory loopholes, or evading regulators’ detection of wrongdoing.165 These 
present and anticipated technological developments are relevant factors in 
determining whether to regulate and how to do so. Prohibitive command-
and-control regulations may inhibit development of societally beneficial 
(and even consumer-protective) technologies. Fostering technological in-
novation is a social good, and innovation-dampening effects of regulation 
are externalities worth considering, but this model does not directly in-
clude such considerations. 
Another example is antidiscrimination laws. These laws are intended 
to protect particular would-be participants in transactions, and the model 
therefore includes them in part. But they are also intended to contribute to 
broader societal goals, the inculcation and promulgation of important 
norms and values that go beyond a particular situation to some of our most 
cherished, fundamental values. The effect a given policy would have on 
discrimination norms more broadly (i.e., as affecting others outside of a 
particular consumer-merchant relationship) is not reflected in the 
model.166  
Numerous other values and goals could be added to this list. Envi-
ronmental and public health concerns are implicated in some consumer 
transactions. Consumer law disclosure regimes, which are intended to 
make sure corporate responsibility can be assigned for violations of law, 
can be used by competitors to threaten businesses’ interests in maintaining 
trade secrets and other competitive aspects of their firm’s activities.  
These externalities are certainly relevant to the normative considera-
tion of particular policies. Inclusion of these factors might lead to a variety 
of conclusions about regulation: one set of risks lies primarily in under-
regulation of systemically risky or discriminatory activities. Another set 
of risks lies in overregulation of (technologically enabled) commerce, and 
the innovation-dampening, anticompetitive effects of compulsory disclo-
sure of trade secrets.  
This Article is intended to support, and not preempt, efforts to include 
a broader range of factors in commercial policy analysis. While this Arti-
cle’s model focuses on consumer-merchant relations, a similar modeling 
effort might illuminate analogous interrelationships among different types 
of constraints in other relevant areas. Certainly, the challenges presented 
  
 164. See generally Bradley, supra note 3, at 63–80. 
 165. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 166. It is also, of course, possible that certain policies might be most effective in accomplishing 
broader societal goals (for instance, those requiring public commitments and building “compliance 
culture” within firms). Others, by contrast, might have little effect on society at large but affect par-
ticular consumer relationships in a concrete way (for instance, policies that simply try to take certain 
forms of discrimination off the table, such as Airbnb’s practical move to mask characteristics that 
hosts were using to profile potential guests, see Bradley, supra note 3, at 90 n.102). These distinctions, 
too, provide reasonable bases for policy discussions. 
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by technological and social change raise significant policy concerns be-
yond those traditionally considered in the consumer protection literature. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s consumer protection model provides a simplified, styl-
ized depiction of complex realities. But it provides a flexible and compre-
hensive way of fitting together the many nuanced strands of empirical, 
theoretical, and doctrinal scholarship that have made consumer law a vi-
brant and growing area of attention (and controversy) in the United States 
and globally. This model depicts how different types of constraints on con-
sumer commercial relationships work together, affect one another, and 
must be tracked carefully over time in order for accurate policy judgments 
to be formed. 
The most important extension of this work will be in showing how 
not only the model, but consumer policy itself, could better incorporate 
distinctions among different types of consumers and merchants, different 
types of transactions and relationships, and among the various justifica-
tions thought to support different types of consumer protective laws and 
institutions. This model will hopefully aid in that future research and pol-
icymaking. 
 
